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PROBLEMS WITH COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY
ARBITRATION: ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THE NEW
MEXICO EXPERIENCE*
JUDGE WILLIAM P. LYNCH**
High costs of litigation and perceptions that court dockets are over-crowded have
led courts across the country to search for other methods of resolving disputes. New
Mexico's courts have participated in this endeavor. In the 1990s, New Mexico's
two largestjudicial districts, the Second and Third Judicial Districts, adopted courtannexed mandatory arbitration (CAMA) programs by local rule.'
CAMA has been promoted as a way of achieving settlement of cases before trial.
Yet, many CAMA programs contain provisions that go beyond encouraging pretrial
settlement and that arguably coerce the parties into foregoing their right to trial by
jury. New Mexico's CAMA programs contain two such provisions. First, they allow
an award of unlimited sanctions if a party fails to improve his position when he
appeals for trial de novo. Second, they require the parties to participate at the
arbitration in good faith and allow the arbitrator to enter an award of default or
dismissal against a party that fails to do so.
This Article explores problems presented by CAMA programs and focuses on
these two provisions and other issues presented by New Mexico's CAMA
programs. Part I of this Article provides a brief history of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) and the development of CAMA and discusses in some detail the
CAMA programs adopted in New Mexico. Part 11 discusses the constitutional issues
raised by CAMA and concludes that, while the CAMA programs generally
withstand constitutional attack, the sanctions provisions in the rules may violate a
party's right to trial by jury and equal protection.
Part 4I1 examines whether CAMA programs should mandate that the parties
participate in good faith in the arbitration process and recommends that this
requirement be eliminated or that an objective standard for good faith participation
be adopted. Part IV discusses the provisions that allow attorneys' fees to be shifted
if a party does not improve his position on appeal and concludes that fee shifting
may not be adopted by local rule. This section further concludes that fee shifting
violates the policies behind CAMA. Part V discusses other issues raised by the
CAMA programs, including qualifications of and payment to the arbitrators, the
arbitrator's authority to enter an award of default or dismissal, and the amount of
the arbitration award.

* This Article is in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Judicial Studies degree
program at the University of Nevada, Reno.
** District Judge, Fifth Judicial District, State of New Mexico. B.A. 1975, Northern Illinois University;
J.D. 1979, University of Illinois; M.J.S. 2001, University of Nevada, Reno.
1. SECOND JUDICIAL DIsTRICT LOCAL RULE LR2-603 (MICHIE 1992) [hereinafter 2ND DIST.]; THIRD
JUDICiAL DISTRICT LOCAL RULES LR3-705-10 (MICHIE 1999) [hereinafter 3RD DisT.]. CAMA must be
distinguished from other forms of arbitration. In CAMA, the parties are compelled by the court to submit to
arbitration. In contrast, binding arbitration is a process in which parties voluntarily contract to select an arbitrator
to decide their dispute under the terms set out in their agreement. See Board of Educ. of Carlsbad Mun. Sch. v.
Harrell, 118 N.M. 470,476-77, 882 P.2d 511'516-17 (1994). There are also court-annexed arbitration programs
in which the court refers a case to arbitration after the parties have voluntarily agreed to arbitration. See, e.g., 28
U.S.C. § 654 (Supp. IV 1998).
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The Second Judicial District's experience with CAMA demonstrates that, instead
of decreasing docket congestion, CAMA may actually increase the number of cases
filed. This Article concludes that CAMA has been oversold as the solution to
overcrowded dockets and recommends that courts or legislatures instead adopt
voluntary court-annexed arbitration, mediation, or one of the other ADR processes.
I. HISTORY OF COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY ARBITRATION
The history of contemporary ADR in the United States is composed of several
distinct phases. In the first phase, in the 1960s, communities established
neighborhood justice centers to allow parties to resolve their own disputes without
court intervention.2 In the second phase, in the 1970s and 1980s, states created
screening panels and arbitration of medical malpractice claims in an attempt to
lower the cost of malpractice insurance, and the business community adopted
3
mediation and other ADR techniques to resolve claims more quickly. The third
phase of contemporary ADR, from the 1980s through the 1990s, included the broad
incorporation of ADR techniques into the court system, the very system they were
designed to replace. 4 Proponents of ADR have claimed a variety of benefits. In
addition to resolving cases more quickly and inexpensively, they suggest it allows
the parties to explore underlying interests and consider reconciliation, accords
emotional closure, and also permits more flexibility in resolving the issues than
does a trial.5 However, the primary motivation of court incorporation of ADR has
been as a docket-clearing device, and ADR' s other benefits have been secondary in
the motivation of courts to institutionalize ADR.6
In considering the future of CAMA, it is instructive to consider the experiences
that the federal courts have had with it. In the late 1970s, as part of a Department
of Justice experiment, three federal district courts adopted compulsory, non-binding
arbitration programs.7 In order to test various aspects of proposed legislation
8
pending in Congress, each of the pilot programs had different requirements. The
courts that adopted the CAMA programs did so by promulgating local rules, and
9
there was no specific Congressional approval for these programs.

2. See Lucy V. Katz, CompulsoryAlternativeDisputeResolution and Voluntarism: Two-HeadedMonster
or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 3; Edward F. Sherman, The Impact on LitigationStrategy of
IntegratingAlternative DisputeResolution Into the PretrialProcess, 168 F.R.D. 75 (1996) [hereinafter Sherman,
The Impact on Litigation Strategy]; Developments, The Pathsof Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1851, 1852
(2000).
3. See Katz, supra note 2, at 3; Sherman, The Impact on Litigation Strategy, supra note 2, at 76.
4. See Katz, supra note 2, at 1, 4; Sherman, The Impact on LitigationStrategy, supra note 2, at 76.
5. See Edward F. Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternativeDisputeResolution: What Form of Participation
Should Be Required?46 SMUL. REv. 2079, at 2081-83 (1993) [hereinafter Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative
Dispute Resolution]; Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional
Issues, 68 ORE. L. REV. 487, 488 (1989).
6. See Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternativeDisputeResolution, supranote 5, at 2081-83; Katz, supra
note 2, at 5.
7. Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1979); A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as
Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1593 (1991).
8. Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 567 n.3.
9. See Levin, supra note 7, at 1579-80.
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In 1988, Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
which authorized the expansion of the experimental CAMA programs." The Act
authorized ten district courts to compel parties to participate in CAMA, and another
ten district courts to refer cases to arbitration when the parties voluntarily
consented. " In those districts that adopted mandatory programs, the Act prevented
courts from imposing any costs or penalties on a party that appealed for trial de
novo other than payment of the arbitrator's fee. 12 The Act permitted the court to
impose attorneys' fees on a party that voluntarily submitted to arbitration and then
demanded trial de novo, but only if the demand for trial de novo was made in bad
faith and the party did not obtain a judgment substantially more favorable than the
arbitration award.' 3 In 1990, Congress decided to expand and enhance the use of
ADR, directing each federal district court to specifically consider providing courtsponsored ADR measures. 4
Debate continued concerning the efficacy of mandatory arbitration in the federal
courts. At Congressional hearings held in 1997, D. Brock Hornby, Chief Judge of
the U.S. District of Maine and Chair of the Federal Judicial Conference's
Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, opposed a plan to
require mandatory arbitration in all federal district courts. 5 Judge Hornby testified
that five of the ten federal districts authorized to compel mandatory arbitration had
either abandoned it, made it a voluntary procedure, or rarely used it, and that several
of the districts authorized to refer cases to arbitration when the parties consented
also rarely used it.'6 He recommended that, instead of requiring mandatory
arbitration in all federal district courts, Congress consider expanding voluntary
court-annexed arbitration programs or mediation programs in the federal courts.17
Congress responded by enacting the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA)
of 1998.8 The ADRA mandates that because of the potential benefits offered by
ADR, every federal district court establish an ADR program.' 9 The ADRA also
authorizes federal courts to compel participation in mediation or early neutral
evaluation. 2' The Act, however, does not authorize federal courts to compel
participation in CAMA. Instead, the Act requires consent from the parties before

10. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 901-907, 102 Stat.
4642, 4659-4664 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988)).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651(a), 652(a) and (a)(1)(A), 658(1) and (2) (1988).
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 655(d)(2) and (4) (1988); Sharon A. Jennings, Note, Court-Annexed Arbitration and
Settlement Pressure: A Push Towards Efficient Dispute Resolution or "Second Class" Justice? 6 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 313, 323 (1991).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 655(e) (1988); Jennings, supra note 12, at 323-24.
14. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. M1 1991)).
15. Alternative Dispute Resolution and Settlement Encouragement Act, 1997: Hearings on H.R.2603
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House of Representatives' Comm. on the
Judiciary(1997) (statement of the Honorable D. Brock Hornby).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (Supp. IV 1998)).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 652(a).
20. Id.
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2
a case can be referred to court-annexed arbitration. 1The Act does not include any
22
penalties if a party demands trial de novo.
Because of the diversity of the state court system, there is no similar way to trace
the development of ADR and CAMA in state courts. Over the years, courts have
expanded the types of cases referred to ADR and the kinds of ADR processes that
the parties may use, but there is great variety in the ADR programs incorporated
into state justice systems.2 3
The Second and Third Districts' foray with CAMA is not New Mexico's only
Act in 197124
experience with ADR. New Mexico adopted the Uniform Arbitration
to encourage the arbitration of cases to conserve time and resources for the parties
25
and the courts, and in 1976 adopted the Medical Malpractice Act to make liability
insurance available to health care providers and to discourage non-meritorious
malpractice lawsuits. In 1986, the legislature approved the administration of ADR
programs, including arbitration, mediation, and settlement facilitation, established
26
by local rule and approved by the New Mexico Supreme Court.

A. CAMA in New Mexico's Second JudicialDistrict
In 1991, the Second Judicial District, which encompasses New Mexico's largest
27
city, Albuquerque, adopted by local rule a CAMA program. This program was
developed in response to increasing caseload pressure and built upon the Second
28
District's success with court-ordered mediation in domestic relations cases. As
initially adopted, the program required that all civil cases filed in the District, where
no party sought relief other than a monetary judgment in excess of $15,000, be
submitted to non-binding arbitration.29 In 1997, the District's local rules were
amended to raise the amount in controversy limit to $25,000.30 Certain categories
of cases, including adoptions, probates, and domestic relations, are excluded from
the program.3' All parties to a case are required to file a certification indicating
whether the party seeks damages that exceed $25,000.32 If no party seeks an award
exceeding that amount, when the case is at issue, the court will enter an order
referring the case to arbitration.33 In addition, any civil action, regardless of the

21. The ten district courts that established CAMA programs under the Civil Justice Reform Act are
exempted from compliance with the consent rule for new arbitration programs. 28 U.S.C. § 654(d).
22. 28 U.S.C. §§ 652, 654.
23. See Wayne D. Brazil, Continuingthe ConversationAbout the CurrentStatus and the Future ofADR:
A View from the Courts, 11 J. DIsP. RESOL. 12 (2000).
24. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to 22 (Michie 1971); K.L. House Constr. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 91
N.M. 492,493,576 P.2d 752, 753 (1978).
25. N.M. STAT. ANN.

§§

41-5-1 to 29 (Michie 1976); Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985),

overruled on other grounds, Grantland v. Lea Regional Hospital, 110 N.M. 378, 796 P.2d 599 (1990).
26. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-6-44 and 45 (Michie 1994).
27. 2ND DIST. LR2-603.

28. Telephone Interview with W. John Brennan, Chief Judge, Second Judicial District Court (Sept. 1,2000);
see also 2ND DIST. LR2-504.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Exclusive of punitive damages, interest, costs and attorneys' fees. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(lI)(A).
2ND DIST. LR2-603(ll)(A).
2ND DIST. LR2-603(1)(A).
2ND DIST. LR2-603(IU)(B).
Id.
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amount in controversy, may be submitted to the arbitration program if the parties
stipulate to arbitration and the court finds the stipulation to be appropriate.3'
Arbitrators are selected from a pool of attorneys, which includes all active
members of the State Bar of New Mexico who have been licensed to practice law
for five years and who maintain an office in Bernalillo County.35 The parties may
stipulate to the appointment of any licensed attorney as the arbitrator.36 In the event
they do not do so, the court will appoint an arbitrator either by random selection or
by court selection. Under random selection, three attorneys selected at random from
the pool are proposed as arbitrators. Each party may peremptorily strike one
attorney proposed, and the first attorney remaining after the peremptory strikes are
exercised is appointed as the arbitrator."7 Under court selection, for good cause, the
court selects an arbitrator, and the parties have no right of peremptory excusal.38
The Second District's rules purport to grant immunity from liability to arbitrators
for conduct within the scope of their appointment.3 9 Arbitrators in the Second
District are paid $100 per case for their services.'
Once a case has been referred to arbitration, the assigned judge will stay further
proceedings in district court pending completion of the arbitration.4 The arbitrator
has broad powers to determine how the arbitration will proceed and shall "consider
the efficient, cost-effective and informal resolution of the case as a factor in all the
arbitrator's decisions and in all aspects of the arbitrator's management of the
case." 42 The arbitrator is authorized to limit discovery "whenever appropriate."4 3
The parties are required to participate in the arbitration proceeding in good faith and
are subject to sanctions, including an award of default, if they fail to do so." Except
for certain categories of evidence, the rules of civil procedure and the rules of
evidence apply during the arbitration.4 5
The arbitrator is to complete the arbitration and submit a final decision within
120 days of her appointment.' The arbitrator is not limited by the certification of
the parties that the amount in controversy is less than $25,000 and may award
damages in excess of that amount. 47

34. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(I).
35. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(IV)(A).
36. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(IV)(C)(3).

37. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(IV)(C)(I).
38. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(IV)(C)(2).
39. 2NDDIST. LR2-601(E).
40. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(IV)(D).

41. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(A).
42. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(A)(2).
43. Id.
44. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(4).
45. The parties may present deposition testimony without complying with N.M. R.Civ. p. 1-032 and reports
from expert witnesses and estimates and bills for services and products may be admitted if certain requirements
are met. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(A)(3); 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(C)(2).
46. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(A)(5); 2NDDIST. LR2-603(V)(D)(1). The Court may extend the 120-day period
for good cause. See 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(A)(5).
47. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(D)(2).
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Any party may appeal the award entered by the arbitrator by filing a notice of
appeal.48 After the notice is filed, the case is returned to the same status on the
assigned judge's docket that it had prior to the referral to arbitration and proceeds
in the form of a de novo proceeding." During the appeal, neither the parties nor the
court may make any reference to the arbitrator's award pending decision of the case
by the fact finder.5"
The Second District's rules provide a disincentive to appeal from the award of
the arbitrator by providing for sanctions if the party that appeals does not improve
his position on appeal.51 If the appealing party does not improve his position on
appeal, the court may award the other party's expenses incurred on appeal,
including attorneys' fees, costs, and interest.5 2
The Second District has compiled the following statistics on its CAMA
program53 :
Year

Cases
Filed in
District
Court

Cases
Referred
to
CAMA

Percentage
Referred
to CAMA

Arbitration
Awards
Entered

Awards
Appealed
for Trial

Percentage
Appealed

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

11,401
11,713
10,849
11,431
12,005
12,202
12,623
12,801

515
649
610
654
770
741
960
1,063

4.5%
5.5%
5.6%
5.7%
6.4%
6.1%
7.6%
8.3%

256
324
261
211
No Data
No Data
342
455

60
82
60
55
No Data
No Data
113
135

23%
25%
23%
26%
No Data
No Data
33%
30%

These statistics demonstrate three important matters. First, an increasing
percentage of cases has been referred to CAMA since the program began. While the
total number of cases filed in the Second District from 1992 to 1999 increased by
approximately eleven percent, the number of cases referred to CAMA nearly
doubled. Second, the parties resolved the majority of cases referred to CAMA
before an arbitration award was entered. For example, sixty-four percent of the
cases referred to CAMA in 1998 and fifty-seven percent of the cases referred to
CAMA in 1999 were resolved before an arbitration award was entered. Third, for

48.
1-055 and
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

A party may not appeal a default judgment but may seek to have it set it aside under N.M. R. CIV. P.
1-060. See 2ND DIsT. LR2-603(VI)(A) and (B).
2ND DIsT. LR2-603(VI)(C)(l) and (2).
2ND DIsT. LR2-603(VI)(C)(2).
2ND DIsT. LR2-603(V)(D).
Id.
Letter from Roberta Beyer, Court Alternatives Director, Second Judicial District (Feb. 22, 2001).
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the cases that proceeded to an arbitration hearing, the arbitration award resolved the
case only sixty-seven to seventy-seven percent of the time.
The Second District reports that plaintiffs file approximately one third and
defendants file approximately two thirds of CAMA appeals.54 Whether parties are
abusing the CAMA program, either by simply "going through the motions" at the
arbitration hearing, or by filing groundless appeals, could be discerned by analyzing
statistics on the sanctions imposed when a party fails to improve his position at trial
de novo. However, the Second District has not kept statistics on this issue.
To compare the Second District CAMA program's case resolution rates to
resolution rates in other New Mexico judicial districts, I analyzed statistics for the
Fifth Judicial District Court in Chaves County, which has not implemented a
CAMA program. From January 1, 1997, to December 31, 2000, 445 tort cases, 578
real estate cases, and 1018 contract/debt and money due cases were filed in the
District Court in Chaves County." Admittedly, the comparison between the Second
District CAMA program and the Chaves County cases is not exact. First, the Chaves
County statistics include all cases filed, and the damages requested are not limited
to less than $25,000. Second, Chaves County is more rural in nature than the
Second District, which encompasses Albuquerque, New Mexico. Even with these
limitations, however, the comparison is informative. The vast majority of the cases
studied in Chaves County from 1997 to 2000 were resolved before trial: eighty-four
percent of the tort cases, ninety-one percent of the real estate cases, and ninety-two
percent of the contract/debt and money due cases were resolved before trial.56
B. CAMA in New Mexico's ThirdJudicialDistrict
In 1999, the Third Judicial District also adopted by local rule a CAMA
program.57 This program is very similar to the current program utilized in the
Second Judicial District. Subject to certain exceptions, all civil cases in which no
party seeks to recover money damages in excess of $25,000 are referred to
CAMA.58 The parties may stipulate to an arbitrator, or the arbitrator will be selected
using the same procedures followed in the Second District. 9 Proceedings in district
court are stayed during the pendency of the arbitration, and the arbitrator has 120
days in which to render a decision, which may exceed $25,000.60 The parties are
required to participate in the arbitration proceeding in good faith and are subject to
sanctions if they fail to do so; they are also subject to sanctions, including payment
of the other party's attorneys' fees, if the party appealing de novo does not improve
his position at trial.6

54. Memorandum from Roberta Beyer, Court Alternatives Director, Second Judicial District (Jan. 18,2001).
55. Letter from Bee J. Clem, Fifth Judicial District Court Clerk, Chaves County (Mar. 6, 2001).
56. Id.
57. 3RDDisr. LR3-705-l0.
58. 3RDDIST. LR3-706(A). Categories of cases generally excluded from the program include student loans,
foreclosures, and adoptions, although the court in its sole discretion may refer any civil case to arbitration. 3RD
DIST. LR3-703. The parties may also stipulate to refer any civil matter to arbitration, regardless of the amount in
controversy. 3RD DIST. LR3-707.
59. 3RD DIST. LR3-708(C).
60. 3RD DIST. LR3-709(A)(l); 3RD DIST. LR3-709(A)(5); 3RD DIST. LR3-709(D)(2).
61. 3RD DIST. LR3-709(A)(4); 3RD DIST. LR3-710(D).
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The Third District's CAMA program differs from the Second District's program
in two important respects. First, the districts have chosen different methods to
compensate the arbitrators. The Second District pays each arbitrator a flat fee of
$100 per case from court funds.62 In contrast, the Third District requires the parties
to pay the fees of the arbitrator, and the fees are based on an unpublished fee
schedule.63 The arbitrator may apply to the court for additional compensation if the
arbitrator believes that the fee is inadequate considering the complexity of and time
spent on the case. 6 A party unable to pay the arbitrator's fee because of undue
hardship may petition the court for relief from the fee.65
Second, the Third District does not grant immunity to arbitrators for conduct
within the scope of their appointment as the Second District attempts to do. 6
Whether arbitrators have absolute, or only qualified immunity for actions within the
scope of their authority, and whether that immunity flows from the common law or
should be established by statute, have been subjects of considerable discussion.67
In New Mexico's Medical Malpractice Act, the legislature granted absolute
immunity from civil liability to panelists on the medical review commission and to
witnesses who testify before the commission for actions within the course and scope
of their duties. 68 Also, New Mexico's Uniform Arbitration Act was recently
amended to grant to arbitrators immunity from civil liability, supplementing any
immunity under other law.69
Because the program has been in existence only a short period of time, the Third
District does not have statistics concerning the number of cases referred to CAMA,
the number of cases appealed, or the number of cases in which sanctions have been
awarded when a party failed to improve his position at trial de novo.7 °
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO CAMA PROGRAMS
There have been a variety of constitutional challenges to CAMA programs over
the years. The programs have been challenged on the grounds that they violate a
litigant's right to trial by jury, due process (including right of access to the courts),
equal protection, and separation of powers principles.7 While similar programs
have generally withstood constitutional challenge, the penalty provisions found in
the Second and Third Districts' CAMA programs may violate a party's
constitutional right to trial by jury and equal protection.72

62. 2ND DIsT. LR2-603(IV)(D).
63. 3RD DIST. LR3-708(D)(l).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. 2ND DIsT. LR2-601(E).
67. See, e.g., Kevin C. Gray, Note, Torts-Wagshall v. Foster: Mediators, Case Evaluators,and Other
Neutrals-Should They Be Absolutely Immune? 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1229 (1996); Mark A. Sponseller, Note,
Redefining Arbitral Immunity: A Proposed Qualified Immunity Statute for Arbitrators,44 HASTINGS L.J. 421
(1993).
68. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-20(E) (Michie 1976).
69. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-15(A) and (B) (Michie 2001).
70. Telephone Interview with Jeanne Emmerson, ADR Coordinator, Third Judicial District (Feb. 14,2001).
71. See Golann, supra note 5, at 493; Kimberly J. Mann, Comment, ConstitutionalChallengesto CourtOrderedArbitration,24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1997).
72. New Mexico's appellate courts have not considered constitutional challenges to CAMA programs. Only

Spdng 2002]

COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY ARBITRATION

A. Right to Jury Trial
The right to jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution does not apply to the states.73 Thus, whether the Second and Third
Districts' CAMA programs violate a litigant's right to jury trial must be decided
under Article 1, Section 12, of the New Mexico Constitution, which protects the
right to jury trial in civil cases in New Mexico.7" A litigant's right to jury trial
would be violated if a mandatory arbitration program compelled the parties to
submit to binding arbitration without resort to the courts.75 No CAMA program,
either state or federal, precludes a party from appealing to the trial court for de novo
proceedings, and both Districts' plans pass muster on this issue because they permit
appeal for trial de novo.76
Further, to be constitutional, the right to appeal for trial de novo must not be
burdened by practices or procedures that significantly burden or impair the right to
have a jury ultimately determine issues of fact.77 Both Districts' programs could be
subject to constitutional attack on this issue because they allow for unlimited
sanctions to be imposed upon a party who does not improve his position on
appeal.7 8 The Second and Third Districts' programs provide that an appellant who
does not improve his position on appeal shall pay all opposing parties' expenses
incurred during the appeal, including but not limited to reasonable attorneys' fees,
costs, and pre-judgment interest dating from the arbitration award.79
The seminal case on this issue is from Pennsylvania, In re Smith,"0 in which
Smith challenged the validity of a local rule that required arbitration of cases where
the amount in controversy did not exceed $1,000.81 Smith contended that the
requirement that the arbitrators' fees be paid by the appellant, whether or not the
appellant was successful on appeal, violated his right to jury trial.82 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the issue was whether Smith's right to
jury trial was "burdened by the imposition of onerous conditions, restrictions or

one New Mexico appellate case considers issues raised by CAMA. Aragon v. Westside Jeep/Eagle, 117 N.M. 720,
876 P.2d 235 (1994) (holding N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-060 applies to a motion to set aside a judgment adopting an
arbitration award).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see, e.g., Board oflEduc. ofCarlsbad Mun. Sch. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470,481,
882 P.2d 511, 522 (1994).
74. N.M. CONST. art. I, § 12.
75. See, e.g., Christie-Lambert Van & Storage Co., Inc. v. McLeod, 693 P.2d 161, 166 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984); see generally Golann, supra note 5, at 504.
76. See Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F.Supp. 566, 567 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Christie-Lambert, 693 P.2d at
163; 2ND DIsT. LR2-603(VI)(C)(2); 3RD DIsT. LR3-710(C)(2).
77. See Richardson v. Sport Shinko, 880 P.2d 169, 188 (Haw. 1994); In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625,629 (Pa.
1955).
78. See Golann,supra note 5, at 5 10 (discussing that "[t]he most difficult questions concerning impairment
of jury trial rights arise from ADR penalties, including cost-shifting provisions....").
79. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V1)(D); 3RD DIST. LR3-710(D). Whether attorneys' fees can be shifted by local rule
is discussed infra at section IV(A).
80. 112 A.2d 625 (Pa. 1995).
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 630.
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regulations which would make the right practically unavailable. 8 3 The court noted
that whether a sanction amounts to a substantial restriction on the right to jury trial
is a question "of degree rather than of kind."' Although the court upheld the
validity of the arbitration plan, the court, recognizing that Smith's demand for
damages was less than $250, concluded that arbitrator's fees totaling $75 "would
seemingly operate as a strong deterrent, amounting practically to a denial of that
right" and required courts to lower the rate of compensation where small claims
were involved.85
The Hawaii Supreme Court addressed this issue more recently in Richardson v.
Sport Shinko (Waikiki Corp.).8 6 The court began its analysis by noting that "the right
to jury trial has never been construed so broadly as to prohibit reasonable conditions
upon its exercise."87 The court rejected a claim that the "specter of sanctions" that
could be imposed against a party is the standard for determining whether the party's
right to jury trial has been impermissibly burdened.88 Instead, the court determined
that Hawaii's CAMA program had a legitimate purpose, and then turned to examine
the sanctions available under the program.89 The court held that the potential
magnitude of the sanctions was not per se unreasonable because the sanctions were
currently limited to $5,000 in attorneys' fees plus actual costs.9" The court then
examined whether the amount of sanctions actually imposed in the case was so
disproportionate to the amount in controversy as to operate as a practical denial of
the right to a jury trial. The court concluded that, where the amount in controversy
was arguably between $60,000 and $150,000, sanctions in the amount of $5,234.41
were not unreasonable and did not violate the plaintiff's right to a jury trial.91
While the few cases that have addressed this issue establish that the amount of
sanctions imposed in a case must not be so disproportionate to the amount in
controversy as to operate as a practical denial of the right to a jury trial, no court has
developed a "bright line" test to determine when a sanction violates a party's right
to jury trial. The Hawaii Court of Appeals recently affirmed sanctions in the amount
of $14,211.26 when the defendant failed to prevail at trial de novo and the amount
in controversy was arguably between $25,175 and $60,000.92 Another court
affirmed an award of attorneys' fees of $3,000 when the plaintiff prevailed at trial
de novo and recovered $3,090 in damages.93
New Mexico courts have approved reasonable procedural regulations that govern
how to secure the right to jury trial. Reasonable time limits within which to demand

83. Id. at 629 (quoting from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Capital Traction v. Hof, 174
U.S. 1,23 (1899)).
84. Id. at 630.
85. Id.
86. 880 P.2d 169, 187 (Haw. 1994).
87. See id. at 188.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 188-89.
90. Id. at 189-90.
91. Id. at 190.
92. Gump v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 5 P.3d 418,442,450 n.6 (Haw. App. 1999) affd in part, rev'd in part
by 93 Haw. 145, 5 P.3d 407 (Hawaii's CAMA program currently limits the recovery of attorneys' fees to an amount
not to exceed $15,000.).
93. Christie-Lambert Van & Storage Co., Inc. v. McLeod, 693 P.2d 161, 166-68 (Wash. App. 1984).
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a jury or serve a jury demand do not unconstitutionally abridge the right to jury
trial.9 Further, New Mexico's rules require payment of a daily jury fee and provide
that failure to pay the fee constitutes a waiver of the right to jury trial.95 While no
cases construe the constitutionality of these provisions, these rules place a small
financial burden on the right to jury trial and presumably would be considered
reasonable regulations on the procedure to be followed in exercising the right to
trial by jury.
In contrast, CAMA rules may allow the imposition of unlimited sanctions against
a party that does not improve his position on appeal. While an award of sanctions
may not often occur, when it does occur, the sanctions awarded can be substantial.
A judge in the Second Judicial District awarded attorneys' fees and costs in excess
of $30,000 against a defendant who did not prevail upon appeal of an arbitrator's
award to District Court.96 A Michigan court awarded sanctions against a plaintiff
that exceeded $560,000 after the plaintiff rejected a mediation evaluation and
recovered less than the evaluation at trial.97 Other courts have awarded large sums
in attorneys' fees as sanctions.98 Although no mathematical formula has been
designed, an award of sanctions that is disproportionate to the amount in
controversy will violate a litigant's constitutional right to jury trial.
B. Due Processand Right ofAccess to the Courts
A civil cause of action is a property right that is protected by the due process
clause." Due process considerations are flexible, depending on the circumstances
of the particular case, but require that the proceedings be fundamentally fair to the
individual." ° CAMA programs address due process concerns with a two-step
approach: while the parties are required to participate in an arbitration hearing that
may not meet constitutional standards, the programs allow dissatisfied litigants to
obtain due process through a de novo appeal to district court.1 ' The issue becomes
whether CAMA programs constitute an unreasonable barrier to the parties' right of
access to the courts. 102

94. See Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 107 N.M. 688,692,763 P.2d 1153, 1157 (1988) overruled on other grounds; Carlisle v. Continental Oil Co., 81 N.M. 484, 484-85, 468 P.2d 885, 885-86 (Ct. App.
1970).
95.

N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-038 (C) & (D).

96. See Whitney Buchanan, StrategiesforLitigatingCourt-AnnexedArbitrationandAppeals Vol. XXVI,
No. 8, N.M. TRIAL LAw., 188-89.
97. See Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp., 533 N.W.2d 373, 377, 386-87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995). The court did
not consider whether this sanction violated the plaintiff's right to jury trial, but upheld the sanction against an equal
protection challenge.
98. See Ashland Chemical Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261,262 (5th Cir. 1997) (upholding a trial court's
award of $53,465.60 in attorneys' fees and expenses); Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College, 865 F.2d 88, 90
(6th Cir. 1988) (upholding a trial court's award of $35,439.70 in attorneys' fees).
99. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,428-30 (1982).
100. See Board of Educ. of Carlsbad Mun. Sch. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470, 478, 882 P.2d 511, 519 (1994)
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)); Gonzales v. Gonzales, 103 N.M. 157, 163,703 P.2d 934,940
(Ct. App. 1985).
101. See Golann, supra note 5, at 540.
102. See id. However, at least one court has determined that the due process analysis is essentially the same
as the right to jury trial analysis. See Richardson v. Sport Shinko, 880 P.2d 169, 188-189 (Haw. 1994).
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While all persons enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts, the origin
of the right has been a matter of some debate. Most courts locate the source of the
right in the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances, and in similar provisions in state constitutions,0 3 but the source has also
been identified as the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2,
and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." Not only
is there debate about the origins of the right of access, but the proper contours of the
right are ill-defined. Professor Carol Andrews has concluded that the right of court
access is narrow in scope: It "is one of initial access only. This means that the
petition right is merely the right to file a civil complaint. It does not affect the
substantive rights of litigants or the ability of the legislature to define, limit, or even
eliminate causes of action."'0 5 Others have defined the right of access more broadly:
The right of access to the courts is "substantive, rather than procedural, and thus
'cannot be obstructed, regardless of the procedural means applied.""'
There is general agreement that the right of access to the courts is neither
absolute nor unlimited. 0 7 Many courts have not specifically articulated the standard
of review to be applied when analyzing this issue.' Other courts and commentators
have applied differing standards of review, ranging from strict scrutiny through a
"chilling effect" analysis to a reasonableness review of the burden on a party's right
of access to the courts.1 9 Certain statutes have been found to violate the
constitutional right of access, while others have survived constitutional attack."0
New Mexico first recognized a constitutional right of access to the courts in 1983
in Jiron v. Mahlab."' The court found the source of the right in the First
Amendment right to petition and the due process clauses found in both the United
States and New Mexico Constitutions." 2 The court considered whether a provision
in the Medical Malpractice Act that required Mrs. Jiron to submit her claim to the
Medical Review Commission before filing suit deprived her of her right of access
to the courts. The court applied a due process analysis to determine whether the Act

103. See Bill Johnson's Rest., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983); In re Workers' Compensation
Refund, 46 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir. 1995); Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 694,700 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997); Cove Road Development v. Western Cranston Indus. Park Assoc., 674 A.2d 1234, 1236 (R.I. 1996). See
generally Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of the FirstAmendment.
Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999).
104. See Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 246 (2nd Cir. 1997).
105. Carol Rice Andrews, Motive Restrictions on CourtAccess: A First Amendment Challenge, 61 OHIO
ST. L.J. 665, 681 (2000) [hereinafter Andrews, Motive Restrictions on CourtAccess].
106. Acevedo v. Suries, 778 F. Supp. 179, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344
(2d Cir. 1987)); In re Workers' Compensation Refund, 46 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir. 1995).
107. See Sears v. Romer, 928 P.2d 745, 750 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
108. See Gordon v. Marrone, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98, 102 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept. 1994).
109. See Andrews, Motive Restrictionson CourtAccess, supranote 105, at 687-91; Acevedo v. Suries, 778
F.Supp. 179, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Firelock, Inc. v. District Court in and for the 20th Judicial District, 776 P.2d
1090, 1096 (Colo. 1989).

110. See Wolfgram v. Wells Fargo Bank, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 694, 700 (Cal. App. 3rd. Dist.1997) (holding
California's "vexatious lawsuit" statute does not impermissibly burden the right of access to the courts); In re
Workers' Compensation Refund, 46 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding statute that shifted attorneys' fees
regardless of who prevailed in the case violated right of access to the courts).
111. 99N.M.425,659P.2d311 (1983).
112. Id. at 426, 659, P.2d at 312.
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unconstitutionally deprived Mrs. Jiron of her right of access to the courts." 3 The
court recognized that the right of access to the courts is not guaranteed in all
circumstances but concluded that the statute deprived Mrs. Jiron of her right of
access to the courts because the delay in proceeding before the Commission would
cause Jiron to be unable to make personal service on the defendant." 4
In Richardsonv. CarnegieLibraryRestaurant,Inc., 5 the New Mexico Supreme
Court again considered the right of access to the courts when examining the damage
limitations found in New Mexico's dramshop statute." 6 Recognizing that the right
of access is not explicitly guaranteed in Article II, Section 18 of the New Mexico
Constitution, the court determined that the right was an implicit fundamental right
entitled to the equal protection guarantees found in the Constitution." 7 The court
held that a party has a right to a full recovery in tort under the New Mexico
Constitution and concluded that the damage limitations in the statute denied the
plaintiffs equal protection and impermissibly restricted the plaintiffs' right of access
to the courts."'
The most extensive discussion of the constitutional right of access to the courts
in New Mexico is found in Trujillo v. City ofAlbuquerque,"9 in which the plaintiffs
challenged the damage caps found in the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. 20 The court
recognized that the ability of a party to have access to the courts to resolve legal
claims "is not boundless" and held that the right does not guarantee the continued
existence of a cause of action or remedy. 2' The court determined that the right of
access to the courts is not synonymous with a right of full tort recovery against the
state and its political subdivisions.'2 2 The court articulated a limited scope for the
right of access to the courts in New Mexico, stating that the right of access to the
courts does not control the scope or substance of remedies provided, and merely
assures litigants that the courts are open to plaintiffs to prosecute claims.' 23 The
court upheld the constitutionality of the damage caps, concluding that the right of
access to the courts does not create a right to unlimited government tort liability.'2 4
The State of New Mexico has a legitimate interest in conserving its judicial
resources and promoting the proper administration of the court system. Requiring
parties to participate in CAMA before seeking trial de novo is not an unreasonable
burden on the right of access to the courts. 2 5 However, there are no cases that
consider whether the imposition of a large award of sanctions against a party that
fails to improve his position on appeal constitutes an unreasonable burden on the

113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 107 N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988).
116. Id. at 692, 763 P.2d at 1157.
117. Id. at 696, 763 P.2d at 1161.
118. Id. at 699, 763 P.2d at 1164.
119. 125 N.M. 721, 965 P.2d 305 (1998).
120. Id. at 723, 965 P.2 at 307.
121. See id. at 727, 965 P.2d at 311.
122. See id. at 728-29, 965 P.2d at 312-13.
123. See id. at 727, 965 P.2d at 311.
124. See id. at 728-29, 965 P.2d at 312-13.
125. See Firelock, Inc. v. District Court in and for the 20th Judicial District, 776 P.2d 1090, 1096 (Colo.
1989); Golann, supra note 5, at 541.
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126
right of access to the courts. The court in Firelock, Inc. v. District Court
considered a provision in Colorado's CAMA program that required a party to pay
the costs of the arbitration proceeding, up to $1,000, if the party did not improve his
position at trial de novo by at least ten percent. The court concluded that the
provision did not place an unreasonable burden on the right of access to the
courts.127
It is unlikely that an award of attorneys' fees as sanctions under the CAMA
programs would constitute an unreasonable burden on New Mexico's right of
access to the courts. The United States Supreme Court has concluded that an award
of attorneys' fees and other costs against a party who lost a lawsuit would not
violate the right of access guaranteed under the First Amendment.2 s An appellate
court in New York similarly affirmed an award of $10,000 in attorneys' fees as a
sanction to curb abusive and frivolous litigation, concluding that the award did not
impermissibly infringe upon the First Amendment right of access to the courts.'29
Because the right of access to the courts in New Mexico is limited, and imposing
attorneys' fees against a party who fails to improve his position on appeal is at least
arguably related to the State's interest in conserving judicial resources, the
attorneys' fee shifting provisions in the CAMA programs do not impermissibly
burden a party's right of access to the courts.

C. Equal Protection
The equal protection clause guarantees that all persons who are similarly situated
will receive like treatment by the law.'" ° Despite claims that courts should apply a
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, courts have found that CAMA programs do not
significantly interfere with a party's fundamental rights, such as right of access to
the courts and right to trial by jury, and have instead applied a rational-basis
standard of review.' 3 ' Specific challenges under the equal protection clause that
have been rejected include claims that the programs (1) arbitrarily assign cases to
mandatory arbitration based on the amount or the subject matter of the case,'32 (2)
treat litigants differently because the programs apply only in some judicial
they award sanctions only against
districts,' 33 and (3) discriminate unfairly3 because
4
the party that appeals for trial de novo.
New Mexico is likely to apply a rational basis standard when analyzing equal
protection challenges to the CAMA programs. Since only classifications based on
race, national origin, or alienage have been treated as suspect classes, and only
classifications based on gender and illegitimacy have been treated as sensitive

126. 776 P.2d 1090 (Colo. 1989).
127. Id. at 1096.
128. Bill Johnson's Rest., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 747 (1983).
129. See Gordon v. Marrone, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98, 102 (N.Y.A.D. 2. Dept. 1994).
130. See Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1097.
131. See Richardson v. Sport Shinko, 880 P.2d 169, 191 (Haw. 1994); Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1097-98;
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 574-576 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
132. Richardson, 880 P.2d at 191; Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098-99; Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 576; Davis
v. Gaona, 396 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Ga. 1990).
133. Firelock, 776 P.2d at 1098; Kirnbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 575.
134. Kimbrough, 478 F. Supp. at 575.
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classes, the class of CAMA parties that incur attorneys' fees when they do not
prevail at trial de novo will not constitute a suspect or sensitive class to trigger strict
or intermediate scrutiny.'35 Further, claims that the CAMA programs violate a
party's right to jury trial or right of access to the courts do not necessarily mandate
that strict scrutiny be applied. In Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque,'36 the court
addressed both right of access to the courts and equal protection challenges to the
damage caps in the Tort Claims Act. After rejecting the right of access to the courts
challenge, the court concluded that the interests at stake were of an economic or
financial nature and applied the rational basis test to analyze the equal protection
challenge to the Tort Claims Act cap.'37
For purposes of equal protection analysis, the issue is whether the unlimited
sanctions allowed by the Second and Third Districts' programs are rationally related
to the Districts' goals of expediting litigation and conserving court resources. In
Haberkorn v. Chrysler Corp.,'3 8 the Michigan Court of Appeals upheld against an
equal protection challenge a provision that allowed the imposition of unlimited
sanctions when a party rejected a mediation evaluation and then recovered less than
the evaluation at trial.139 The trial court awarded sanctions against the plaintiff that
exceeded $560,000 after the plaintiff rejected a mediation evaluation of $1.5 million
and then recovered less than the evaluation at trial. " The court of appeals did not
analyze the issue presented, but simply concluded that the sanction provision was
rationally related to the legitimate purpose of expediting litigation, and put plaintiffs
and defendants equally at risk when they rejected mediation evaluations.'4 1
An argument can be made that imposing unlimited sanctions is not reasonably
related to the Districts' goals. In an analogous case, the United States Supreme
Court upheld against an equal protection challenge to a Mississippi statute that
provided for a fifteen percent penalty if a party did not improve its position on
appeal and affirmed an award of $243,000 against the defendant. 4 2 The Court
determined that the State had a legitimate interest in discouraging frivolous appeals
and compensating a prevailing party for enduring appellate litigation, the statute did
not improperly single out a class of appellants because the penalty applied to both
plaintiffs and defendants, and there was a rational connection between the statute's
objective and the means chosen by the State to achieve it.' 43 The Court posited that
"the 15% penalty here is a relatively modest additional assessment.'
This statement prompted Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, to question the
"modesty" of a mandatory $243,000 penalty. 45 Justice Blackmun recognized that
135. See Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 696, 763 P.2d 1153, 1161 (1988);
Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 125 N.M. 721,726,965 P.2d 305, 310 (1998).
136. 125 N.M. 721,726, 965 P.2d 305, 310 (1998).
137. Id. at 728-30, 965 P.2d at 312-14; see also, Pinnell v. Board of County Com'rs of Santa Fe, 127 N.M.
452, 457-60, 982 P.2d 503, 508-11 (Ct. App. 1999).
138. 533 N.W.2d 373 (Mich. App. 1995).
139. Id.at 387.
140. Id. at 378.
141. Id. at 387.
142. Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
143. Id. at 80-84.
144. Id. at 84.
145. Id. at 90 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
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"surely a penalty need not foreclose an appeal before it is recognized as
burdensome" and concluded that the statute was not reasonably related to the
interests advanced in its defense.146 Justice Blackmun further concluded that the
statute was not properly tailored to discourage only frivolous appeals because the
penalty is imposed whenever the judgment is affirmed, despite the merits of the
appeal.

147

The sanctions in the Second and Third Districts are not limited to a percentage
of the amount recovered at the arbitration hearing or at trial de novo and are applied
despite the merits of the appeal. In addition, the Second District' s CAMA program
has not succeeded in its promise to reduce court dockets but has actually increased
the number of cases referred to CAMA. 148 A court could conclude that the CAMA
programs violate equal protection because the imposition of unlimited sanctions
without considering the merits of the appeal is not reasonably related to the
programs' goals.
D. Separation of Powers
The separation of the powers of the government into three distinct branches is
expressed implicitly in the United States Constitution and explicitly in Article 1H,
Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution.' 49 This principle is designed to prevent
one branch of government from dominating the other two branches and is derived
from concerns that concentrating the powers of the government into one branch
would create a system with an inherent tendency toward tyrannical actions.'
CAMA programs adopted by statute have been challenged on the ground that the
statute is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to private individuals by
the legislature. 5 ' This claim has been summarily rejected.'52 Many courts have
recognized that the essence of judicial power is the final authority to render and
enforce a judgment or remedy. 3 Because CAMA programs allow the parties to
appeal for trial de novo, the arbitrator's decision is non-binding. Thus, the
not exercising judicial power in violation of the separation of powers
arbitrators5are
4
principle.
The Second and Third Districts adopted their CAMA programs by local rule.
Adoption of similar programs by local rule has been criticized as a basic procedural
innovation that is beyond the scope of local rules. "5Opponents of adoption by local

146. Id.
147. Id. at 91-92.
148. See supra note 53.
149. N.M. CONST. art. 11, § 1; Board of Educ. of Carlsbad Mun. Sch. v. Harrell, 118 N.M. 470,483, 882
P.2d 511, 524 (1988).
150. See Harrell, 118 N.M. at 483, 882 P.2d at 524; Michael E. Browde & M. E. Occhialino, Separationof
Powers and the JudicialRule-Making Power in New Mexico: The Need for PrudentialConstraints, 15 N.M. L.
REv.407 (1985).
151. Golann, supranote 5, at 530-31; Frelock, Inc. v. Dist. Court in and for the 20th Judicial Dist., 776 P.2d
1090, 1093 (Colo. 1989).
152. Firelock,776 P.2d at 1093-1095.
153. Id. at 1094; Harrell, 118 N.M. at 484, 882 P.2d at 525.
154. Firelock,776 P.2d at 1094-95.
155. See linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis as a Method for Determining the Validity of
Federal District Courts' Exercise ofLocal Rulemaking Power: Application to Local Rules Mandating Alternative
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rule argue that the legislature, not the courts, should decide whether CAMA is a
permissible way to reduce court congestion, whether CAMA will undermine the
role of the courts as a co-equal branch of government, and whether CAMA will
present a risk to impartial, fair, just, and independent judicial decision making.' 56
Other commentators have suggested that local rules that allow experiments on a
small scale must, in the end, either be adopted by the legislature or terminate
because the "label 'experiment' is not another device for amending or ignoring the
national rules."' 57 In contrast, proponents of adoption by local rule have defended
the practice as clearly within the scope of a district court's rulemaking power and
necessary to keep the court system from collapsing under the growing weight of its
caseload. 5 '
The CAMA programs adopted in New Mexico are likely immune from a
successful separation of powers challenge. The New Mexico Supreme Court has
ruled that matters of practice and procedure in the courts are the sole province of
the judiciary and that the legislature lacks the power to adopt statutes that govern
procedural matters. 5 9 Procedural law has been defined as "the practice and
procedure or legal machinery by which the substantive law is determined or made
effective," while the substantive law "creates duties, rights and obligations."' 6 ° In
New Mexico, therefore, if CAMA is considered to be procedural, the courts do not
need the approval of the legislature to adopt it.' 6 '
In contrast to statutes that remove cases from the district courts,'62 CAMA
prescribes procedures to be followed in the judicial process after a case is filed and
before it is set for trial. In addition, district courts have legitimate interests in
regulating their dockets, promoting judicial efficiency, and deterring frivolous
litigation.'63 New Mexico's CAMA programs are designed to foster early
settlements of cases, which will allow the courts to regulate their dockets and
promote judicial efficiency."6 While it is often difficult to draw a clear distinction
between substance and procedure,'65 the CAMA programs in New Mexico are likely
to be considered procedural and thus validly adopted by the courts. "
Dispute Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REv. 483, 538 (1991). In New Mexico, local rules "shall not conflict with"
statewide rules or statutes. N.M. R. CIv. P. 1-083 (A).
156. See Rusch, supra note 155, at 528-34.
157. Levin, supra note 7, at 1593.
158. See A. Leo Levin & Deirdre GolashAlternative Dispute Resolution in Federal District Courts, 37 FLA.
L. REV. 29,49-51 (1985); Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566,573-74 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Davis v. Gaona,
396 S.E.2d 218, 221 (Ga. 1990).
159. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 312, 551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1976), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978). This doctrine has been criticized as representing a departure from coordinate
rulemaking power shared by the judiciary and the legislature and is not followed in many states. Browde &
Occhialino, supra note 150, at 443-47 and Appendices B and C.
160. Honaker v. Ralph Pool's Albuquerque Auto Sales, Inc., 74 N.M. 458,463,394 P.2d 978,983 (1964).
161. Whether the CAMA programs may shift attorneys' fees by local rule is discussed infra Section IV(A).
162. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-17.1(d) (Michie 1991) removes cases from the district court by requiring
compulsory arbitration of an appeal from a school board's decision to discharge a certified school employee.
163. New Mexico Right to Choose/Naral v. Johnson, 127 N.M. 654, 659, 986 P.2d 450, 455 (1999).
164. 2ND DisT. LR2-601(A); 3RD DIST. LR3-701(A).
165. See Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 89 N.M. 307, 310,551 P.2d 1354, 1357 (1976), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 906 (1978); Browde & Occhialino, supra note 150, at 444-46.
166. A validly adopted local rule has the force of law. See Spingola v. Spingola, 91 N.M. 727,745,580 P.2d
958, 966 (1978).
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I1.GOOD FAITH PARTICIPATION REQUIREMENT
The Second and Third Judicial Districts' CAMA rules require that the parties
participate in good faith in the arbitration proceedings and authorize the arbitrator
to enter an award of default or dismissal against any party that fails to participate
in good faith. 167 The term "participate in good faith" is not defined in the rules.
Whether a party has a duty to participate in good faith during CAMA has been the
69
subject of considerable controversy in numerous casesI68 and law review articles.
Analysis of this issue is complicated by the variety of statutes and rules
concerning the extent of participation required. In Oregon, for example, no statute
7
or rule requires that a party participate in good faith at the arbitration. ' The
Oregon courts have held that a party has an absolute right to a trial de novo that
7
cannot be lost even if the party fails to appear at the arbitration.' ' In Iowa, the
parties are required simply to "participate," without further requirement that the
participation be in good faith or in a meaningful manner.'72 The Illinois arbitration
rules, in contrast, require that all parties participate at the arbitration hearing "in
good faith and in a meaningful manner."' 7 3 Failure to participate in good faith in
Illinois is grounds for barring a party from rejecting the arbitration award and
denying trial de novo, although lesser sanctions may also be imposed.'7 4

What constitutes good faith participation in arbitration is not easy to define.

There is general agreement that sanctions may not be awarded because a party
refused to make any offer at all during the arbitration or because one party, or even
the arbitrator, believes that a party did not offer "enough."' 7 5 As the Supreme Court
of Nevada stated, "There is no duty under the arbitration rules governing good or
bad faith participation proceedings to enter into settlement negotiations or to agree

167. 2ND DIST. LR2-603 (V)(A)(4); 3RD DIST. LR3-709 (A)(4).
168. See Wertheimer v. Acret, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1992); Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988 (Fla.
App. 1992); Schmidt v. Joseph, 733 N.E.2d 694 (111. App. Ct. 2000); Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp.
169 (D.N.J. 1989); Campbell v. Maestro, 996 P.2d 412 (Nev. 2000); Monroe v. Harmon, 973 P.2d 392 (Or. Ct.
App. 1999); Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1992).
169. See Matthew A. Tenerowicz, Comment, "Case Dismissed"-or Is It? Sanctions for Failure to
Participatein Court-MandatedADR, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 975 (1998); Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good
Faithin Mediation-Requested,Recommended, or Required?A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REv. 575 (1997); David
S. Winston, Note, ParticipationStandards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: "You Can Lead a Horse to
Water... ,11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 187 (1996); Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternativeDispute Resolution,
supra note 5.
170. See Main St. Asset Corp. v. Cunningham, 778 P.2d 1003, 1004 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
171. See id.; Monroe v. Harmon, 973 P.2d 392, 394 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).
172. See Graham v. Baker, 447 N.W.2d 397, 400-01 (Iowa 1989) (involving statutory farm mediation
service).
173. ILL. STAT. S. Ct. R. 91(b).
174. See Walikonis v. Halsor, 715 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1ll. App. Ct. 1999) (holding trial court abused its
discretion in striking request for trial de novo, affirming default judgment on liability, remanding case for trial on
issue of damages only).
175. See Texas Parks and Wildlife Dept. v. Davis, 988 S.W.2d 370, 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1999) (holding,
"[w]hile a court may compel parties to participate in mediation, it cannot compel the parties to negotiate in good
faith or settle their dispute"); Campbell v. Maestro, 996 P.2d 412, 415 (Nev. 2000); State v. Carter, 658 N.E.2d
618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (mandatory mediation); Halaby, McCrea & Cross v. Hoffman, 831 P.2d 902, 908 (Colo.
1992) (reversing sanctions imposed after a court settlement conference, the court held that "[aln 'adequate' amount
of settlement authority will vary based on the circumstances of each case, and a settlement conference judge should
not impose sanctions because, in his opinion, the amount is insufficient").
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to make payment of any claim at any time regardless of the merits thereof."' 76 This
position is consistent with the realities of litigation in New Mexico. A summary of
tort verdicts in New Mexico for 1998 demonstrates that plaintiffs won fifty-three
percent and that defendants won forty-seven percent of the trials.'77 The parties
must be assured that they can forcefully argue their positions (i.e., that there is no
liability, or that plaintiff's claim is not worth more than a certain sum) during the
arbitration without the threat of sanctions being imposed.'7
A good example of this proposition is found in State v. Carter.7 9 Carter sued the
State of Indiana for injuries that she claimed she received when she slipped and fell
on State property. At a mandatory mediation, the State offered $3,000 to resolve the
claim, which Carter rejected. 8 ' Carter then moved to impose sanctions against the
State for failure to participate in good faith at the hearing, and the trial court,
without specifying its reasoning, granted sanctions against the State.' The court
of appeals reversed the award of sanctions.8 2 In analyzing this issue, the court
recognized that parties may take a firm stance during the proceedings and need not
simply accede to the other party's demands.' 3 The court also determined that it was
not the duty of the court to decide whether the State's offer to settle was
reasonable.' In deciding that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
sanctions, the court of appeals concluded, "Carter offers no explanation as to why
her refusal to settle on the State's terms is less culpable than the State's refusal to
85
settle on her terms."'1
The good faith participation standard has been criticized as inherently ambiguous
and, thus, difficult to enforce with any consistency. 86 When one party claims that
the other party failed to participate in good faith, the standard seems to require the
court to examine a party's subjective motives rather than its objective conduct. 187
This standard will lead courts into making complex investigations into what
occurred during an arbitration proceeding. 8' This will necessitate hearings before
the trial court for sanctions for failure to participate in good faith, and appellate
review of the trial court's decisions, that could undermine the claims that CAMA
economically and efficiently resolves cases. 189

176. Campbell, 996 P.2d at 415.
177. See William J. Corbett, An Analysis of 1998 TortJury Verdicts in New Mexico, N.M. BAR J., Fall 1999,
48-52.
178. See Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2093 (discussing that
"ADR offers a process of assisted negotiation where the parties should be able to choose to be forthcoming and
make concessions or not").
179. 658 N.E.2d 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
180. Id. at 620. Indiana's mediation rules require the parties to mediate in good faith. Id. at 621.
181. Id.at 620-21.
182. Id. at 620.
183. Id. at 623.
184. Id. at 622.
185. Id.at 623.
186. See Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2089-94; Winston,
supra note 169, at 197.
187. See Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2093.
188. See id.
189. See id; Winston, supra note 169, at 189.
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The experience in Illinois with courts attempting to define good faith
participation and imposing sanctions for failure to participate in good faith
substantiates these concerns. Illinois adopted CAMA to provide the parties with
9
expedited decisions and "an alternative to costly and lengthy litigation." ° In 1993,
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 91 was amended to require both parties to participate
in good faith at the arbitration hearing. 9 ' A flood of litigation in Illinois concerning
the parameters of good faith participation and what sanctions are appropriate for
failure to participate in good faith has ensued. There are at least nineteen recently
reported cases from the Illinois Court of Appeals that discuss the requirement that
a party participate at the arbitration in good faith and whether sanctions should be
imposed for failure to participate in good faith. 92 The extent of satellite litigation
over sanctions for bad faith participation severely undermines the claim that CAMA
in Illinois provides the parties with expedited decisions and an alternative to lengthy
litigation.
CAMA programs have different provisions about the point during the arbitration
process at which a party must participate in good faith. Illinois Supreme Court Rule
91(b) requires the parties to participate "in the hearing" in good faith and in a
meaningful manner. 193The Illinois courts have interpreted this rule to require good
faith participation only at the arbitration hearing itself, not during the entire
arbitration process.' 94 Thus, conduct that occurs prior to or after the arbitration
hearing cannot be used to support a finding that a party did not participate in good
faith.)95 Nevada Arbitration Rule 22 requires a party to prosecute or defend a case
in good faith "during the arbitration proceedings."' 96 Under this Rule, the Nevada
courts have examined a much broader range of conduct than whether the party
participated at the arbitration hearing in good faith. The extent to which a party
conducted pre-arbitration discovery, whether the party personally attended the
arbitration hearing, whether an insurer routinely files requests for trial de novo
190. Kolar v. Arlington Toyota, Inc., 675 N.E.2d 963 (111.App. 1Dist. 1996), aff'd688 N.E.2d 653 (111.App.
Ct. 1997).
191. ILL. STAT. S. Ct. R. 91(b); Martinez v. Gaimari, 649 N.E.2d 94 (1. App. Ct. 1995), reh'g and appeal
denied, 657 N.E.2d 624 (1995).
192. Eichler v. Record Copy Serv., 742 N.E.2d 1245 (111.App. Ct. 2000); Schmidt v. Joseph, 733 N.E.2d
694 (111. App. Ct. 2000); Gore v. Martino, 728 N.E.2d 495 (111. App. Ct. 2000); Goldman v. Dhillon, 717 N.E.2d
474 (11. App. Ct. 1999); Easter Seal Rehabilitation Center for Will-Grundy Counties, Inc. v. Current Development
Corp., 716 N.E.2d 809 (IIl. App. Ct. 1999); Walikonis v. Halsor, 715 N.E.2d 326 (11. App. Ct. 1999); Hinlde v.
Womack, 707 N.E.2d 705 (111.App. Ct. 1999); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Kazakova, 702 N.E.2d 254 (l. App. Ct.
1998); Employer's Consortium, Inc. v. Aaron, 698 N.E.2d 189, appeal denied, 705 N.E.2d 436 (1998); Allstate
App. Ct. 1997),
Ins. Co. v. Avelares, 693 N.E.2d 1233 (1. App. Ct. 1998); Bachman v. Kent, 689 N.E.2d 171 (11.
reh'g denied and appeal withdrawn, 698 N.E.2d 542; Hill v. Joseph Behr and Sons, Inc., 688 N.E.2d 1226 (111.
App. Ct. 1997); West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Herrera, 686 N.E.2d 645 (M1.App. Ct. 1997); Knight v. Guzman, 684
App. Ct. 1997); Webber v.
App. Ct. 1997); State Farm Ins. Co. v. Gebbie, 681 N.E.2d 595 (Ill.
N.E.2d 152 (il.
Bednarczyk, 678 N.E.2d 701 (111.App. Ct. 1997); Moon v. Jones, 668 N.E.2d 67 (Il. App. Ct. 1997); Kellett v.
Roberts, 667 N.E.2d 558 (111. App. Ct. 1996); Martinez v. Gaimari, 649 N.E.2d 94 (111. App. Ct. 1995), reh 'g and
appeal denied, 657 N.E.2d 624 (1995).
193. ILL. STAT. S. CT.R. 91(b).
194. See Walikonis v. Halsor, 715 N.E.2d 326, 329 (1ll. App. Ct. 1999).
195. See id.; Knight v. Guzman, 684 N.E.2d 152, 153-54 (111.App. Ct. 1997) (holding defense counsel's
customary rejection of other arbitration awards is not indicative of bad faith participation); Webber v. Bednarczyk,
678 N.E.2d 701, 703-04 (111.App. Ct. 1997) (finding defendant's alleged failure to conduct a reasonable
investigation and failure to admit liability before the arbitration are not evidence of bad faith participation).
196. NEV. STAT. S. CT. ARB. R. 22.
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without regard to the facts and circumstances of the individual case, and whether
a party changed litigation tactics or strategy after seeking trial de novo have been
considered by Nevada courts as they grapple with whether a party participated in
good faith. 9 7
Both the Second and Third Districts' rules require that the parties participate in
good faith "in the arbitration proceedings."' 9 8 If both Districts continue their CAMA
programs with a subjective good faith participation requirement,'" New Mexico
courts should look to conduct that occurs prior to, during, and after the arbitration
hearing itself to determine whether a party has complied with his obligation to
participate in good faith.
Courts do not agree about the level of participation at the arbitration hearing that
is necessary to sustain a finding of good faith participation. In Hinkle v. Womack,2"
the trial court barred the defendant from appealing the arbitration award when the
defendant did not appear personally at the arbitration hearing and defense counsel
admitted liability for the accident, but contested proximate cause and damages by
cross-examining the plaintiffs and challenging their claims for damages.2"' The trial
court concluded that the defendant failed to participate at the arbitration in good
faith, and the Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed. 0 2 The court posited that the
mandatory arbitration process loses its value when a defendant fails to subject the
plaintiff's case to the type of adversarial testing that would be expected at trial.2" 3
The court concluded that simply cross-examining witnesses and making arguments
to rebut a plaintiff's case is not the type of adversarial testing that would be
expected from a defendant at trial.2°4
The Nevada Supreme Court reached the opposite result in Gittings v. Hartz."5
The arbitration hearing in Gittingslasted less than one hour and consisted primarily
of direct testimony from Gittings, cross-examination, and a review of medical
records and bills supporting Gittings's claims of damages. 2" The Nevada Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's decision to strike Hartz's request for trial de novo,
explaining that the constitutional right to jury trial is not waived simply because
individuals can disagree over the most effective way to represent a client at an
arbitration proceeding. 0 7 The court found that the failure of a party to attend the
arbitration or to call witnesses at the hearing "does not amount to bad faith or lack

197. See Gittings v. Hartz, 996 P.2d 898 (Nev. 2000); Campbell v. Maestro, 996 P.2d 412 (Nev. 2000).
198. 2ND DIST. LR2-603 (V)(A)(4); 3RD DIST. LR3-709 (A)(4).

199. This Article concludes that both Districts should abandon CAMA for other ADR techniques, such as
mediation or early neutral evaluation.
200. 707 N.E.2d 705 (11l. App. Ct. 1999).
201. Id. at709-10.
202. Id. at 706.
203. Id. at 710. As Judge Posner noted, however, judicial opinions are full of confident assertions that have
no demonstrable factual basis that should be tested scientifically to see if they are true. Richard A. Posner, The
Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53
U. CHi. L. REv. 366, 367 (1986).
204. 707 N.E.2d at 710. See also Martinez v. Gaimari, 649 N.E.2d 94 (ll. App. Ct. 1995), reh'g and appeal
denied, 657 N.E.2d 624 (1995).
205. 996 P.2d 898 (Nev. 2000).
206. Id. at 901-02.
207. Id.
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of meaningful participation., 20 8 The court further found that there may be many
valid reasons why a defendant would not retain a medical expert to perform an
independent medical examination during arbitration, stating, "Effective crossexamination may be sufficient to point out discrepancies in a person's claim of
injury without such testimony, or without presentation of 'countervailing medical

evidence. "209

The position taken by the Nevada Supreme Court on the level of participation
required at the arbitration hearing seems to be the better-reasoned approach and one
more consistent with the policies behind CAMA. In New Mexico, as in Nevada,
CAMA was designed to be a simplified, informal procedure to resolve certain types
of cases economically and at an early stage of the proceeding." ° CAMA in New
Mexico is not designed to be, and is not, a substitute for trial.2 ' Further, due regard
for litigant autonomy mandates that attorneys should be able to choose what they
present at an arbitration hearing without fear that they will be sanctioned for bad
faith participation.2 12
A comparison of the good faith participation requirements adopted by the courts
in their CAMA programs with provisions adopted by the New Mexico Legislature
in the Medical Malpractice Act is informative.213 The Medical Malpractice Act was
adopted in 1976 to make liability insurance available to health care providers in
New Mexico and to prevent the filing of non-meritorious malpractice lawsuits.21 4
Except for punitive damages and medical care and related benefits, the Act caps
recovery for malpractice claims at $600,000 per occurrence and requires the
plaintiff to submit his malpractice claim to the medical review commission before
it is filed in district court.2 15 The legislature did not require either the plaintiff or the
health care provider to participate in good faith at the hearing before the medical
review commission, and the commission is not authorized to award sanctions
against a party that fails to make a proper presentation to the commission. 216 It
seems anomalous to require good faith participation in hearings where the amount
in controversy does not exceed $25,000, but not where a party has been seriously
harmed or has died as a result of medical malpractice.
The Second and Third Districts should eliminate the good faith participation
requirement from their CAMA programs. If the Districts decide to maintain a
participation requirement, to avoid disputes over the subjective nature of a good
faith participation standard, the Districts should adopt an objective standard for
participation that will comport with the theory behind CAMA. This could be
accomplished by amending the CAMA rules to more clearly define the level of
208. Id. at 902. The court stated that the defendant's decision not to seriously contest liability at the
arbitration could be grounds "to support an alternative sanction, such as limiting the issues to be tried in trial de
novo to damages." Id. at 902 n.5.
209. Id. at 902; see also Chamberland v. Labarbera, 877 P.2d 523 (Nev. 1994).
210. 2ND DIsT. LR2-601(A); 3RD DIST. LR3-701(A); Gittings, 996 P.2d at 902.
211. 2ND DIST. LR2-601(A); 3RD DIST. LR3-701(A).
212. See Sherman, Court-Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2087-89.
213. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-1 to 29 (Michie 1976).
214. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-2 (Michie 1976); Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482 (1985),
overruled on other grounds, Grantland v. Lea Regional Hospital, 110 N.M. 378, 796 P.2d 599 (1990).
215. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-6 and 15(A).
216. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-19 and 20 (Michie 1976).
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participation required.2" 7 There are two essential elements that should be required.
First, the parties should be required to submit position papers and other relevant
information to each other and to the arbitrator in advance of the hearing.2"'
Professor Sherman proposed that the position papers should address (1) the legal
and factual issues in dispute; (2) the party's position on those issues; (3) the relief
sought, including an itemization of all elements of damages claimed; and (4) any
offers and counter-offers previously made.2 9 Because New Mexico has not adopted
mandatory disclosure rules, the parties should also be required to provide certain
documents, such as current medical records and bills, to each other prior to the
arbitration.2 2 °
Second, the parties and/or their attorneys should be required to attend the hearing
and be prepared to state their positions on the issues presented in the case. When
a party is fully insured and the insurer has assumed that party's defense, there may
be little reason to have that party present because the insurer will usually have sole
authority over defense of the claim, including deciding whether to settle the claim
or go to trial.22 ' Therefore, an adjuster or other representative may be the
appropriate party to attend the hearing.222 Each party must be prepared to discuss
his position on the issues presented by the case and to commit the party to a
particular position in the litigation but should not be required to make a settlement
offer or counteroffer.223 Adoption of such an objective standard will clarify the
participation required by the parties and will decrease the potential of satellite
litigation over whether a party participated in good faith and what sanctions should
be imposed if that party did not.
IV. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AS A SANCTION FOR FAILURE
TO PREVAIL UPON APPEAL
Both the Second and Third Judicial Districts' rules provide that the court may
award attorneys' fees, costs, and interest if the party that appeals for trial de novo
does not receive a decision on the merits that is more favorable than the award made
by the arbitrator.224 While other CAMA plans limit the amount of attorneys' fees
that may be recovered,22 5 there is no such limitation in the Second and Third
217. Professor (now Dean) Sherman has proposed that a "minimal meaningful participation" standard be
adopted. Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2096-2103. Others have noted
that this term is as ambiguous as the term it is designed to replace. Kovach, supra note 169, at 599; Winston, supra
note 169, at 198-99.
218. Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2094-95; Winston, supra
note 169, at 202.
219. Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2095.
220. Compare N.M. R. CIv. P. 1-026 with FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
221. See Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternativeDispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2105; In re Novak, 932
F.2d 1397, 1408 (1 th Cir. 1991).
222. See Sherman, Court-MandatedAlternative Dispute Resolution, supra note 5, at 2105.
223. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989); Campbell v.
Maestro, 996 P.2d 412,415 (Nev. 2000).
224. 2ND DIsT. LR2-603(VI)(D); 3RD DIsT. LR3-710(D). The last sentence in the Third District's rule
confuses an award of attorneys' fees for failure to improve at trial with a party's failure to participate in good faith
during the arbitration. These issues are analytically distinct. See Katz, supra note 2, at 37-45.
225. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4-21A-6(c) (West 2000), which provides that attorneys' fees shall not
exceed $750 in total nor $250 per day.
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Districts' CAMA programs, although the rules allow the court to waive an award
of attorneys' fees for good cause.226 Cases from other jurisdictions establish that
sanctions may be awarded only after trial de novo, although a full trial need not
occur, 227 and that sanctions may be imposed despite the merits of the appeal: the
only relevant inquiries are whether the party improved his position at trial de novo
and whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions.228
Fee shifting provisions present two main issues. First, questions have been raised
concerning whether the Districts can shift attorneys' fees by local rule. Second, fee
shifting provisions are inherently coercive and violate the policies underlying
CAMA.
A. Are the Fee Shifting ProvisionsValid?
New Mexico follows the "American rule," which provides that, "absent statutory
or other authority, litigants are responsible for their own attorneys' fees., 229 "The
American rule recognizes the authority of statute, court rule, or contractual
agreement" as the basis to award attorneys' fees.23 ° Several cases, articulating
different theories, have recognized that district courts do not have the authority to
adopt local rules that award attorneys' fees.
In Ashland Chemical Inc. v. Barco Inc.,23 the Fifth Circuit invalidated a local
rule that shifted attorneys' fees on the ground that it was substantive in nature and
required legislative approval.232 The Eastern District of Texas had adopted a local
rule that required a party to pay the other party's attorneys' fees if the party rejected
an offer and did not receive a final judgment that exceeded the offer by ten
percent.233 Ashland Chemical failed to receive a judgment that exceeded the offer
of judgment, and the district court awarded attorneys' fees under the local rule.234
The Fifth Circuit analyzed whether the local rule was procedural or substantive in
nature, recognizing that if the rule was procedural, it was validly adopted by local
rule, but if it was substantive in nature it must be specifically authorized by
Congress in order to be valid.2 35 After noting the difficulty in determining this

226. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(VI)(D); 3RD DIST. LR3-710(D).
227. Fees may be awarded when a case has been resolved by summary judgment, voluntary dismissal, or
voluntary withdrawal of the request for trial de novo. Perkins Coie v. Williams, 929 P.2d 1215, 1220-21 (Wash.
App. 1997).
228. See Richardson v. Sport Shinko, 880 P.2d 169, 189 (Haw. 1994); Colarusso v. Petersen, 812 P.2d 862,
863-64 (Wash. App. 1991). Cf Bankers Life and Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 92 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting in part). The wisdom of this fee shifting system is questionable, as it is well-established
that "lawyers, judges and juries may produce very different results in the same case." Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill,
"Most CasesSettle": JudicialPromotion andRegulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1347, 1374-75
(1994).
229. New Mexico Right to Choose/Naral v. Johnson, 127 N.M. 654, 657, 986 P.2d 450, 453 (1999); see
generally Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
230. New Mexico Right to Choose/Naral,127 N.M. at 657, 986 P.2d at 453.
231. 123 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997).
232. Id. at 263-64.
233. Id. at 262.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 264-65. The court declined to address whether the local rle impermissibly conflicted with Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 68 and 83 or violated the equal protection clause. Id. at 263 n. 1.
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* 2236
issue,
6 the court distinguished an award of attorneys' fees under the court's
inherent power to sanction for bad faith conduct because that sanction is not tied to
the outcome of the case.237 Because the application of the local rule was tied to the
outcome of the case, the court concluded that the fee shifting provision embodied
a substantive policy that required legislative approval.238 Finding a lack of
congressional approval, the court reversed the award of attorneys' fees, holding that
the district court did not have discretion to use fee shifting as a cost and delay
reduction technique.239
Two other cases have invalidated local rules that provided for the recovery of
attorneys' fees because they conflicted with federal or state rules of civil procedure.
In Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan College,24 the Sixth Circuit reviewed a local
rule that allowed the district court to tax attorneys' fees if the plaintiff did not
recover ajudgment at least ten percent larger than the mediation award.24 When the
plaintiff in Tiedel failed to do so, the trial court awarded attorneys' fees to the
defendant, concluding that the local rule "constituted a valid exercise of its inherent
power to conduct its business in an economical and efficient manner, and that the
imposition of attorneys' fees was a means of encouraging the parties to give serious
' The Sixth
consideration to the mediation."242
Circuit reviewed the history behind
the American rule and the exceptions to the rule, and concluded that awarding
"attorneys' fees is an exceptional remedy that depends on the substantive basis of
' The
the litigation." 243
court reversed the award of attorneys' fees and held that
awarding attorneys' fees was not merely a matter of procedural or judicial
efficiency and that the local rule was contrary to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 2' The Supreme Court of Ohio reached a similar result in Vance v.
Roedersheimer.245 There, the court reviewed a local rule that allowed attorneys' fees
if the party that appealed for trial de novo did not improve his position by more than
twenty-five percent and determined that the local rule was unenforceable because
it conflicted with Rule 54(D) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and earlier case
24
law on allowable costs.
Statutes allowing courts to award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party have long
withstood constitutional attack.24 7 The New Mexico Legislature has not adopted
CAMA by statute, but, in 1986, it approved the administration of ADR programs
in judicial districts that were established by local rule and approved by the Supreme

236. Id. at 265.
237. Id. at 264-65.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 265, 268. See also Crenshaw v. General Dynamics, 940 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1991); Zambrano v.
Tafolla, 885 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1989).
240. 865 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1988).
241. Id. at 90.
242. Id. at 90-91.
243. Id. at 92.
244. Id. at 93-94.
245. 597 N.E.2d 153 (Ohio 1992).
246. Id. at 155-56. The court further found that there was no statutory authorization or evidence of bad faith
that would justify an award of attorneys' fees. Id. at 156.
247. See Life and Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566, 569 (1934).
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Court.24 The ADR programs approved include, but are not limited to, arbitration,
mediation, and settlement facilitation programs.24 9 The statutes do not specifically
authorize CAMA programs and do not expressly allow attorneys' fees to be shifted.
Had the Second and Third Districts' CAMA programs been in existence before
1986, an argument could be made that the legislature approved the fee shifting
mechanisms when it enacted the statutes. However, both programs were instituted
years after the statutes were enacted. In addition, there is no language in the statutes
that implicitly approves fee shifting. Because there is no indication that the
legislature intended to authorize fee shifting when it approved ADR programs
adopted by local rule, the statutes approving the implementation of ADR programs
by local rule cannot shield the fee shifting provisions from attack.
While New Mexico's district courts are authorized to adopt local rules to govern
practice and procedure in the district, the local rules may not affect substantive
rights of the litigants.25 ° New Mexico has defined procedural rules as "the judicial
machinery administered by the courts for determining the facts upon which the
substantive rights of the litigants rest and are resolved."25 ' Procedural law in New
Mexico includes pleading, pre-trial matters, rules of evidence, and other trial and
post-trial mechanisms "designed to accomplish a just determination of the rights
'
and duties granted and imposed by the substantive law."252
In contrast, substantive
law is the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights and duties of
individuals.253
It is often difficult to draw a clear distinction between substance and procedure,
and determining whether attorneys' fees may be shifted under a CAMA program
adopted by local rule presents a difficult issue. At least one commentator has
concluded that the Second District exceeded its authority by adopting fee shifting
by local rule. 54 In contrast, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that a similar
rule adopted by the Michigan Supreme Court was procedural in nature and validly
adopted by the Supreme Court.255 Unfortunately, the majority opinion by the court
of appeals fails to analyze the issues presented and simply concludes that the rule
is procedural, and the opinion by the concurring judge is only marginally more
helpful.256 Regardless of the deficient analysis, the Michigan Supreme Court
subsequently vacated the decision, and the court of appeals, on remand, did not
reconsider whether a rule awarding attorneys' fees was substantive or procedural.257

248. N.M, STAT. ANN. §§ 34-6-44 and 45 (Michie 1994).
249. Id.
250. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-083(A); Beall v. Reidy, 80 N.M. 444, 446,457 P.2d 376, 378 (1969).
251. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 89 N.M. 307,312,551 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1976), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 906 (1978).
252. Id. at 310, 551, P.2d at 1357.
253. See Honaker v. Ralph Pool's Albuquerque Auto Sales, Inc., 74 N.M. 458, 463, 394 P.2d 978, 983
(1964).
254. See Donald F. Harris, Why the 2nd JudicialDistrict'sFee-Shifting Rule, in Its MandatoryArbitration
Program,Is Ultra Vires and Unenforceable,Vol. 6, No. 3 N.M. BAR J. 18 (2000).
255. Maple Hill Apartment Co. v. Stine, 346 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
256. Id. at 557 and 560-62.
257. Maple Hill Apartment Co. v. Stine, 365 N.W.2d 762 (Mich. 1985), on remand382 N.W.2d 849 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1985).
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New Mexico cases recognize that both trial and appellate courts have important
interests in regulating their docket, promoting judicial efficiency, and deterring
frivolous filings. 25" The stated purpose of New Mexico's CAMA programs is
procedural: they are designed to foster early settlements, which will allow the courts
to regulate their dockets and promote judicial efficiency.25 9 However, a rule's stated
purpose is not the sole criteria for determining whether the rule is substantive or
procedural, and the policies behind the rule and the rule's effect on the parties must
also be examined. 26' New Mexico's CAMA programs affect procedures utilized by
the parties because they prescribe rules that the parties must follow after a case is
filed and before it is set for trial.
While the CAMA programs may have been designed for procedural purposes,
imposing attorneys' fees on a party that does not prevail at trial de novo has an
effect on the monetary outcome of a case. The Third Circuit in Jarvisv. Johnson261
considered a similar issue: whether an award of prejudgment interest, pursuant to
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rules, was substantive or procedural for purposes
of application in federal diversity cases.262 The Third Circuit noted that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had previously determined that the rule was a
procedural device, but one with an effect on substantive rights, and thus within the
scope of its rulemaking power, but concluded that this determination did not end the
inquiry. 26 3 Because the rule would operate to increase the amount of money a
plaintiff would receive and a defendant would pay, the Third Circuit considered the
issue "outcome-determinative" and applied the pre-judgment interest rule in federal
26 4
court.

Although determining whether to apply state or federal law in diversity questions
is a different inquiry than determining whether an issue is substantive or procedural
so as to be within a court's rulemaking power,265 application of the Jarvis analysis
is nevertheless useful. An award of attorneys' fees under CAMA increases the
amount of money one party will receive and the other party will pay over the
amount awarded absent the provision. In fact, the amount of attorneys' fees awarded
would generally greatly exceed an award of prejudgment interest. 266 New Mexico
has recognized that there is a compensatory aspect to attorneys' fees awarded as a
sanction for bad faith litigation, 267 and the same compensatory aspect is found in
attorneys' fees awarded in a CAMA program. Therefore, an award of attorneys'
fees under a CAMA program will have an effect on the substantive rights of the
litigants.

258. See New Mexico Right to Choose/Nara] v. Johnson, 127 N.M. 654, 659, 986 P.2d 450, 455 (1999).
259. 2ND DIST. LR2-601 (A); 3RD DIST. LR3-701 (A).
260. See Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1997).
261. 668 F.2d 740 (3rd Cir. 1982).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 744-45.
264. Id. at 745.
265. Id. at 747-48.
266. See Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 262 (5th Cir. 1997) (trial court awarded
$53,465.60 in attorneys' fees and expenses); Tiedel v. Northwestern Michigan Coll., 865 F.2d 88, 90 (6th Cir.
1988) (trial court awarded $35,439.70 in attorneys' fees).
267. State ex rel. New Mexico State Hwy. & Transp. Dep't. v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 5, 896 P.2d 1148, 1152
(1995).
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Further, awarding attorneys' fees when a party fails to improve his position at
trial de novo is analytically distinct from awarding attorneys' fees when a party
violates the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, or when the court invokes its
inherent power to sanction a litigant for bad faith conduct. Sanctions awarded under
Rule 1-011, Rule 1-037, or a court's inherent power to sanction for bad faith
conduct focus on how the parties conduct themselves during the litigation.26 8 In
contrast, sanctions under the CAMA programs do not focus on how the parties
conduct themselves during the litigation but are imposed whenever a party that
appeals for trial de novo does not improve his position compared to the result
awarded by the arbitrator. 269 Because the award of attorneys' fees is tied to the
outcome of the case and not to the conduct of the parties, the fee shifting provisions
are substantive in nature. 270
In New Mexico Right to Choose/Naralv. Johnson, the New Mexico Supreme
Court reemphasized its adherence to the American rule, which "promotes equal
access to the courts for the resolution of bonafide disputes [and].. .tends to preserve
judicial resources." 27' The court declined to award attorneys' fees under the "private
attorney general doctrine," finding that it did not fit within any of the exceptions to
the American rule.272 Although the court noted that both trial and appellate courts
have important interests in regulating their dockets, promoting judicial efficiency,
and deterring frivolous filings, it concluded that adopting the private attorney
general doctrine would "erode the policies underlying the American rule and move
New Mexico courts in the direction of the English system of awarding attorney
fees., 273 The court cautioned against the use of judicial authority to pick which
plaintiffs and causes of action would merit an award of attorneys' fees under the
doctrine.274
Concerns similar to those voiced by the court in Naral are present with the fee
shifting provisions found in the Second and Third Districts' CAMA programs. The
CAMA provisions that shift attorneys' fees affect substantive rights of the parties.
These provisions have not been adopted by the legislature, and judicial districts are
not authorized to pick and choose which causes of action may merit an award of
attorneys' fees. Thus, both Districts have exceeded their rulemaking powers by
adopting fee-shifting provisions by local rule.

268. Rivera v. Brazos Lodge Corp., 111 N.M. 670, 674, 808 P.2d 955, 959 (1991) (holding Rule 1-011
requires a lawyer to exercise honesty and good faith in ascertaining that there are good grounds for a pleading);
Reed v. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc., 129 N.M. 639, 643, 11 P.3d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding Rule 1-037(D)
is designed to curb abuse during the discovery process); State v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 5-6, 896 P.2d 1148, 1152-53
(1995) (finding sanctions pursuant to a court's inherent powers extend only to conduct occurring before the court
or in direct defiance of the court's authority).
269. See Richardson v. Sport Shinko, 880 P.2d 169, 189 (Haw. 1994); Colarussov. Petersen, 812 P.2d 862,
863-864 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
270. See Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261, 265 (5th Cir. 1997).
271. 127 N.M. 654,658,986 P.2d 450,454 (1999).
272. Id. at 659-63, 986 P.2d at 455-59.
273. Id. at 663, 986 P.2d at 459.
274. Id.
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B. Shifting Attorneys' Fees Is Inconsistentwith the Policies Underlying CAMA
Shifting attorneys' fees under a CAMA program presents a more fundamental
problem. CAMA programs must be carefully designed to preserve the access to the
courts that has rendered the judiciary so invaluable an institution.2 75 As the Second
Circuit stated, court rules must not be "designed as a means for clubbing the
parties--or one of them-into an involuntary compromise.2 76 While CAMA has
been promoted as a way to benefit litigants by reducing costs and delays, which
enhances access to the courts, shifting attorneys' fees and costs to a party unwilling
to accept the arbitrator's decision coercively decreases access to the courts.
Even though fee-shifting provisions in a CAMA program adopted by statute may
be constitutional, such provisions create direct pressure on parties to accept the
arbitrator's award because they can impose thousands of dollars of attorneys' fees
on a party even in relatively simple cases.277 Fee-shifting provisions force a party
to take a large financial gamble if he decides to access justice in court and make it
more likely that he will forego trial, despite his proper objections to the award.278
The New Mexico Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that "since litigation is at best
uncertain, one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a
lawsuit," and further recognized that "the poor might be unjustly discouraged from
instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees
of their opponents' counsel." 27 9 Fee-shifting provisions in CAMA programs do not
increase access to justice and may, in fact, decrease access to justice for poorer and
more risk-averse litigants, precisely the litigants that the programs were designed
to help.28 Allowing fee-shifting changes the focus of CAMA from a court-annexed
settlement device to a substitute for trial, disregarding the fact that CAMA is
designed to informally resolve cases early in the process before much discovery is
undertaken.28 '
Because most cases settle before trial,28 2 it may be impossible for fee-shifting
provisions to significantly reduce the low percentage of cases that proceed to
trial.28 3 Many commentators believe that cases that would have settled with
negotiations between the parties are now settled through the use of CAMA or other

275. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1851; Brazil, supra note 23, at 23-26.
276. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
277. See Jennings, supra note 12, at 326; Nancy F. Reynolds, Note, Why We Should Abolish Penalty
Provisionsfor Compulsory Nonbinding Alternative Dispute Resolution, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. REsOL. 173, 182
(1991) ("When courts mandate ADR and penalize parties who are dissatisfied with ADR decisions, the ADR
decisions stand in the same position as pretrial settlement offers and the penalties coerce parties to accept the ADR
decision. In short, judges are accomplishing settlement coercion by calling it 'ADR."').
278. See Craig A. McEwen & Laura Williams, Legal Policy and Access to Justice Through Courts and
Mediation, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 865, 877-878 (1998); Jennings, supra note 12, at 326-27.
279. New Mexico Right toChoose/Naral v. Johnson, 127 N.M. 654,658,986 P.2d 450,454 (1999) (quoting
Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967)).
280. See Lisa Bernstein, Understandingthe Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A Critique ofFederal CourtAnnexedArbitration Programs,141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169,2215-16 (1993); McEwen & Williams, supra note 278,
at 877.
281. See Jennings, supra note 12, at 327.
282. Galanter & Cahill, supra note 228, at 1339-40 (quoted settlement rates of eighty-five to ninety-five
percent are misleading because they do not consider cases terminated by authoritative decision other than by trial,
but at least two-thirds of cases settle without a definitive judicial ruling).
283. Katz, supra note 2, at 47; Jennings, supranote 12, at 327.
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ADR proceeding.284 Fee-shifting provisions are unnecessary because, with CAMA,
the parties are already participating in a settlement mechanism that may help relieve
overcrowded dockets.285
Allowing fee shifting under CAMA is unnecessary because a New Mexico
statute already allows the court to sanction a defendant to encourage early
settlements of cases and to prevent delays. 286 Under Section 56-8-4(B), the trial
court is authorized to award prejudgment interest of up to ten percent from the date
the complaint is served on the defendant after the court has considered whether the
plaintiff was the cause of unreasonable delay in adjudicating plaintiffs claim and
whether the defendant made a reasonable and timely settlement offer.287 These two
factors are not exclusive, and courts have considered whether the defendant delayed
the proceedings, whether the defendant rejected plaintiff s settlement offers, and
whether there were difficult legal issues presented that would likely preclude
settlement when considering whether to award prejudgment interest. 288 In contrast
to the unlimited sanctions allowed under the CAMA programs, imposing a modest
sanction under Section 56-8-4(B) will not unacceptably decrease access to the
courts for litigants.
Further, allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees may add an element of
gamesmanship to the process and will increase the stakes for the parties. Lawyers
may decide to hold back some of their evidence or arguments for trial to ensure that
they are not subject to sanctions should the arbitration not lead to resolution of the
case. 289 One unusually forthright New Mexico plaintiff's lawyer advocates "undertrying" plaintiffs cases filed against a certain insurance company by doing
"discovery after the arbitration... [and] set[ting] the bar low at your arbitration" to
increase the chances of recovering attorneys' fees after the appeal. 2" In addition,
because allowing recovery of attorneys' fees increases the stakes of the litigation,
it may lead both parties to increase their litigation expenditures: the appealing party
will increase his expenditures to increase the probability of prevailing at trial de"
novo and avoiding the imposition of attorneys' fees, while the appellee will likely
increase his expenditures to obtain a more favorable award at trial and recover his
attorneys' fees.29'
V. OTHER ISSUES RAISED BY NEW MEXICO'S CAMA PROGRAMS
There are several other issues raised by the Second and Third Districts' CAMA
programs that require examination.

284. See Sherman, The Impact on Litigation Strategy, supra note 2, at 79 (1996); Galanter & Cahill, supra
note 228, at 1371; Katz, supra note 2, at 53.

285. See Reynolds, supra note 277, at 187-88.
286. See Lucero v. Aladdin Beauty Coll., Inc., 117 N.M. 269, 272, 871 P.2d 365, 368 (1994).
287. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-4(B) (Michie 1993).
288. See Trego v. Scott, 125 N.M. 323, 329, 961 P.2d 168, 174 (Ct. App. 1998); Abeita v. Northern Rio
Arriba Elec. Coop., 124 N.M. 97, 110-111, 946 P.2d 1108, 1121-22 (Ct. App. 1997).
289. See Bernstein, supra note 280, at 2194; Posner, supra note 203, at 374.
290. Buchanan, supra note 96, at 188-89.
291. Bernstein, supra note 280, at 2229-30.
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A. QualificationsofArbitrators
The abilities, performance, and fairness of arbitrators are perhaps the critical
factors in determining how effective a CAMA program will be.292 Proper minimum
qualifications and training for arbitrators are therefore of paramount importance, but
the Second and Third Districts' programs fall short on this component. To be an
arbitrator in the Second Judicial District, an attorney must be licensed to practice
law for five years and maintain an office in Bernalillo County. 293 The situation is
similar, but perhaps worse, in the Third Judicial District, where the pool of
arbitrators includes attorneys who have been licensed to practice law for four years
and who reside or maintain an office in Dofia Ana County, and attorneys licensed
for less than four years who have completed an ADR course approved by the
District. 294 In both Districts, there is no initial training required for arbitrators and
no annual CLE requirement, although the court may require an attorney who is part
of the pool to attend arbitrator training.29
The Districts should not assume that a person is qualified to serve as an arbitrator
simply because that person is a lawyer. Congress rejected a similar
assumption-that all federal magistrates are qualified to serve as neutrals in ADR
processes-and specifically required that they be trained to serve as neutrals in
ADR processes." 9 Congress further required that each district establish standards
for the certification of arbitrators and certify arbitrators in accordance with such
standards. 29 7 The Second and Third Districts should require that only lawyers who
have been in practice at least five years serve as arbitrators and should offer a full
day training session for all arbitrators before they begin their service.29 Arbitrators
should receive training on the mechanics of conducting CAMA, and also about due
process safeguards necessary to protect the rights of the parties and the integrity of
the process.2 99 Increasing the qualifications of the arbitrators and mandating initial
training for them will help ensure that the Districts have high quality CAMA
programs.

292. See Brazil, supra note 23, at 25; Sophia 1.Gatowski, et al., Court-annexedArbitrationin Clark County,
Nevada: An Evaluation of lts Impact on the Pace,Cost, and Quality of Civil Justice, 18, JUST. Sys. J. 287, 298
(1996). The Second and Third Districts' CAMA arbitrators are not bound by the Code of Judicial Conduct and
further are not compelled to disclose facts concerning impartiality required of arbitrators under the Uniform
Arbitration Act. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-001 to 901 (Michie 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7-13 (Michie 2001).
293. 2ND DIST. LR 2-603(IV)(A). Attorneys who have an office outside Bernalillo County and have been
licensed for five or more years may request the court alternatives director to include them in the pool. See id.
294. 3RD DIsT. LR3-708(A). Attorneys who have an office outside Dofla Ana County and have been licensed
for four or more years may request the court ADR coordinator to include them in the pool. See id.
295. 2ND DIsT. LR 2-603(IV)(B); 3RD DIST. LR3-708(B).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 653(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
297. See id.
298. See Gatowski, et al, supra note 292, at 302. Neutrals for the United States District Court, Middle
District, of Louisiana are required to receive forty hours of training in approved ADR course work and must
participate annually in additional ADR training. David B. Allgood, The FederalAlternative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1998 and Its Impact on FederalCourt Practicein Louisiana,48 LA. B. J. 210, 212 (2000).
299. See Developments, supra note 2, at 1869-71, 1874.
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B. Payment of Arbitrators
Compensation for arbitrators presents difficult issues. A compensation system
in which arbitrators are paid a flat and modest fee for their service could lead to
poor performance by the arbitrator, while allowing the arbitrator to charge by the
hour with no limit on the total fee risks imposing unreasonable economic burdens
on the litigants.3" The Second District follows the flat, modest fee approach by
providing compensation to the arbitrator of $100 per case, which is paid by the
District.3"° Such a modest fee may discourage attorneys selected to serve as
arbitrators from adequately preparing for or properly conducting the arbitration
proceeding, which could threaten the quality of the Second District's CAMA
program.
In contrast, the Third District requires the parties to pay fees to the arbitrator
based upon an unpublished fee schedule and allows the arbitrator to apply for
additional compensation if she feels that the fee is inadequate. °2 This provision
presents several obvious problems. First, the District is requiring parties to pay an
additional unspecified fee to participate in a program mandated by the court.
Although the legislature has approved payment of an additional fifteen-dollar
docket fee to create an ADR fund to pay for the cost of operating ADR programs,
there is no legislative approval for requiring the parties to pay the arbitrator's fee.3" 3
Second, because compensation for the arbitrator will not vary greatly with claim
size, this additional cost will impose a greater burden on plaintiffs with small
claims. 3°4 Third, the District needs to publish its fee schedule so that all parties have
notice of the fees to be paid to the arbitrators.
C. Authority of Arbitratorsto Enter Default or Dismissal
The CAMA programs allow the arbitrator to enter an award of default or
dismissal against a party that fails to participate in good faith in the arbitration
proceedings. 5 Private lawyers pressed into service as arbitrators should not be
given this power. As noted previously, both Districts allow lawyers with minimal
qualifications to serve as arbitrators, and there is no initial training and no annual
CLE requirement. Although undoubtedly many experienced, well-qualified lawyers
are selected as arbitrators, there is a real danger that a relatively inexperienced
lawyer, or a lawyer not familiar with the subject matter of the arbitration, will serve
as arbitrator and improperly enter an award of default or dismissal against a party.
to the aggrieved party to establish grounds to set aside
The burden then will shift
30 6
the default or dismissal.
The CAMA rules provide greater authority in this situation to the arbitrators than
is given to special masters, domestic violence commissioners, and domestic
relations hearing officers in New Mexico. Special masters hold hearings on the

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

See Brazil, supra note 23, at 27; McEwen & Williams, supra note 278, at 872-73.
2ND DIST. LR2-603(IV)(D).
3RD DIST. LR3-708(D)(1).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-6-44 and 45 (Michie 1994).
See McEwen & Williams, supra note 278, at 869-70; Bernstein, supra note 280, at 2231-32.
2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(A)(4); 3RD DIST. LR3-709(A)(4).
See 2ND DIST. LR2-603(VI)(A) & (B); 3RD DIST. LR3-710(A).
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issues referred by the district court and then make recommendations to the court. 30 7
While the district court must accept the special master's findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous, the court gives no deference to the special master's
conclusions of law and reviews them de novo. 308 There are other limitations on the
special master's authority: if a witness fails to appear or give evidence, the district
judge, not the special master, imposes sanctions; and if a party fails to appear, the
special master may proceed ex parte or may adjourn the proceedings to allow the
absent party to be present.3 ° In addition, the district court may adopt the report or
may modify or reject it, in whole or in part, or may receive further evidence or
recommit it to the special master with instructions."'
Domestic violence commissioners and domestic relations hearing officers have
similar limitations on their powers. While they may conduct hearings in domestic
violence and domestic relations cases, they may only make recommendations to the
district judge.311 District judges are required to sign all orders before the
recommendations from the commissioners and hearing officers become effective.3 2
Similar safeguards should be incorporated into New Mexico's CAMA programs.
Arbitrators should be limited to reporting to the court their findings of fact and
conclusions of law, including a conclusion that a default judgment or dismissal
should be entered. If objections are filed, the court should then review the
arbitrator's findings and conclusions and hold a hearing before deciding whether to
accept or reject them.
D. Amount of ArbitrationAward
The CAMA rules encourage gamesmanship about the amount of the award
sought and provide an incentive for a plaintiff to mislead the court about the true
value of his claim. To be subject to referral to CAMA, a plaintiff must certify that
his claim does not exceed $25,000.' However, the arbitrator may award damages
in excess of $25,000.314 This allows a plaintiff with a case he believes is worth
$35,000 to $40,000 to request that his case be submitted to CAMA and then, after
abbreviated discovery and under relaxed rules of evidence, seek to recover the full
value of his claim. The solution for this situation is obvious: if a plaintiff certifies
that the value of his case does not exceed $25,000, that certification should be
treated as a stipulation or judicial admission, the party should be bound by it, and
the arbitrator should be restricted to awarding damages of $25,000 or less. In
unusual circumstances, a party should be able to withdraw the admission and the
referral to CAMA.315

307. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-053(D) and (E).
308. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-053(E)(1) and (2); Lozano v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 122 N.M. 103,920 P.2d 1057 (Ct.
App. 1996).
309. N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-053(D)(2) and (E)(2).
310. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-053(E)(2).
311. N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-053.1(C)(4) and (5); N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-053.2(C)(6) and (7).
312. See id.
313. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(1)(A); 3RD DIST. LR3-706(A).
314. 2ND DIST. LR2-603(V)(D)(2); 3RD DIST. LR3-709(D)(2).
315. Both Districts allow the court to withdraw the referral to arbitration for good cause. 2ND DIST. LR2603(V)(A)(10); 3RD DIST. LR3-709(A)(10). Similarly, under N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-036(B), the court has discretion
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CONCLUSION
While ADR has its benefits, CAMA is not the solution to the docket congestion
plaguing New Mexico courts and other courts across the United States. In New
Mexico's programs, CAMA is ordered in every case where the amount in
controversy is less than $25,000, even though most of those cases would have
settled without participation in CAMA.3 16 While arbitration is less expensive than
trial, it is more expensive than the discussions between attorneys that constitute a
normal settlement negotiation.3 t7 CAMA, as adopted in New Mexico, adds a new
layer of administrative expense for courts. CAMA programs also decrease access
to justice for litigants by adding another layer of procedure and forcing them to take
more risk by allowing unlimited sanctions if a litigant fails to improve his position
when he appeals an arbitrator's decision." 8 Obtaining settlement of cases through
coercion is not necessarily a sign of a successful CAMA program.
As Judge Posner theorized years ago, CAMA, instead of clearing trial court
dockets, may actually increase the number of cases filed by reducing the waiting
319
period for trial and lowering the expected costs of litigation. This theory appears
to be borne out by the increasing percentage of cases in the Second District that are
referred to CAMA. While the total number of cases filed in the Second District
from 1992 to 1999 increased by only eleven percent, the number of cases referred
to CAMA more than doubled.32 ° Providing access to justice for litigants with small
claims is an important matter. But if access to justice for litigants with small claims
is the rationale to justify adopting CAMA, it should be expressly recognized as
such, and CAMA should not be touted as a docket-clearing mechanism.
Clearly, the enthusiasm for CAMA has waned in the federal court system, while
the debate over its use in state courts continues. 32' As Justice Frankfurter stated,
"Wisdom too often never comes, and so we ought not to reject it merely because it
comes late. 322 The Second and Third Judicial Districts, and otherjurisdictions that
have embraced CAMA, should follow the experience that the federal district courts
have had with CAMA and modify their ADR programs to eliminate CAMA and
embrace voluntary court-annexed arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation,
or the other ADR processes recommended by the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act.
Courts that continue to use CAMA should evaluate their programs to address the
significant issues raised by these programs. First, New Mexico's CAMA programs,
and other similar programs, are not subject to successful challenge under due

to permit the withdrawal or amendment of a matter admitted by a party.
316. Posner, supra note 203, at 390.
317. See id.; Sherman, The Impact on Litigation Strategy, supra note 2, at 79.

318. See Bernstein, supra note 279, at 2253; Katz, supra note 2, at 46.
319. Posner, supra note 203, at 382, 388.
320. See supra note 53.
321. CompareL. Christopher Rose, Comment, Nevada'sCourt-AnnexedMandatoryArbitration Program:
A Solution to Some of the Causes of Dissatisfaction with the Civil Justice System, 36 IDAHo L. REV. 171 (1999)
with James E. Smith, Don't Rush to Justice: An Argument Against Binding North Dakota Courts to Arbitration,
73 N.D. L. REV. 459 (1997).

322. Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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process and separation of powers principles. Programs that allow the imposition of
unlimited sanctions when a party fails to prevail at trial de novo may violate a
party's constitutional right to trial by jury or equal protection. It is thus important
that CAMA programs limit the sanctions that may be imposed to an amount that
bears some reasonable relation to the amount in controversy, a rule that will not
violate either the right to jury trial or equal protection.
Second, good faith participation requirements in CAMA programs are inherently
ambiguous. As the experience in Illinois demonstrates, these provisions can lead to
satellite litigation that will undermine the purposes of CAMA. CAMA programs
should eliminate this requirement or should adopt an objective standard for
participation that will reduce the potential of satellite litigation.
Third, CAMA programs should eliminate provisions that shift attorneys' fees
when a party does not prevail upon appeal. Attorneys' fees may be shifted by
CAMA programs adopted by statute, but not by programs like those in New Mexico
that are adopted by local rule. While CAMA has been promoted as a way to
increase access to the courts for litigants with small claims, shifting attorneys' fees
coercively decreases access to the courts and is inconsistent with the policies
underlying CAMA.
Finally, CAMA programs should ensure that they have high quality arbitrators
so that they can offer high quality programs. CAMA programs should require that
only lawyers with a minimum of five years of practice serve as arbitrators and
should provide initial training to the arbitrators. Arbitrators should be adequately
compensated on an hourly basis, and the compensation should be paid by the court
system and not by the litigants. Arbitrators should not be granted greater authority
than that given to special masters and should not be authorized to enter an award of
default or dismissal. And, to discourage gamesmanship about the amount of the
award sought, the arbitrator should be limited to awarding no more than the amount
in controversy certified by the party when the case is referred to CAMA.
Elimination of CAMA programs in favor of voluntary court-annexed arbitration,
mediation, early neutral evaluation, or any of the other ADR processes
recommended by the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act is the only real way to
remedy the problems that CAMA programs present. Adoption of the above
recommendations will go a long way, however, to meeting the goals underlying the
adoption of CAMA in New Mexico courts.

